







The absence of literature on reward measures in the European context is counterbalanced
by an immense literature on the repressive-preventive key, which bets on the necessity and
efficacy of its role mostly of neutralisation, rather than prevention. The book contains the
results of the research project “Fighter” (Fight Against International Terrorism. Discover-
ing European Models of Rewarding Measures to Prevent Terrorism), financed by the Eu-
ropean Commission (Justice Programme 2014-2020), which has involved eight European
Universities: Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (P.I.), Università degli studi
di Ferrara, Sveučilište u Zagrebu - Pravni Fakultet, Université Saint-Louis Bruxelles,
Université du Luxembourg, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Ludwig-Maximilians
Universität München, Université de Lille 2. The investigation aims at assessing whether a
“rewarding” approach – favored by Art. 16 Dir. (EU) 2017/541 – can be pursued as a
harmonized and useful tool of prevention of terrorism. The question, on the other hand, is
whether a European model of restorative and collaborative measures already exists or can
be born, or if instead there are more than one model and it is necessary to let them coex-
ist without impossible unifying pushes. More than distinct “models”, however, the re-
search shows that there are differences of “legal systems”, substantive and procedural,
which impose any general “model” to be differentiated according to those distinct norma-
tive and legal realities, or at least force to “flexible” applications because of the different
disciplines and specific preventive purposes that are necessary. At the end of the research
a European model of rewarding measures to prevent terrorism has been drafted, which
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CHAPTER 1
ITALY*
FRANCESCO DIAMANTI, FRANCESCO ROSSI, GIULIA DUCOLI
SUMMARY: 1. Historical background of rewarding legislation (where existing). – 1.1. Socio-po-
litical reasons. – 1.2. Legislative evolution. – 1.3. Case-law evolution. Substantive crim-
inal law profiles: an overview of the temporal validity, the scope and the requirements
of rewarding measures. – 1.3.1. The sequence of rewarding laws with different tempo-
ral effects and the issue regarding the validity of the “Cossiga Law”. – 1.3.2. The scope
of application. – 1.3.3. Collaboration – 1.3.4. The concepts of “disengagement” and
“outstanding relevance”: objective vs subjective interpretation. – 1.3.5. The post-con-
viction phase: the special regime of conditional release. – 1.3.5.1. Objective and sub-
jective meanings of “repentant”; protection of victims of terrorist crimes; seriousness
of the offence, dangerousness and criminal attitude of the offender. – 2. Current re-
warding legislation (where existing). – 2.1. Applicability conditions. – 2.2. Types of re-
warding measures. – 2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, ini-
tiated at the post-sentencing stage. – 2.4. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the
obligations of the repentant – 2.5. Revocation of rewarding measures. – 2.6. Conditions
for the application of the measures (procedural aspects). – 2.7. Conditions for the use
of the declarations obtained (probative value of declarations). – 2.8. Measures for the
protection of the repentant. – 2.9. Evaluation and control of the measure. – 2.10. Re-
vocation of rewarding measures. – 3. Current relevant case law (where existing). –
4. Conformity of the current rewarding legislation to art. 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU.
1. Historical background of rewarding legislation (where existing)
Italy has a long and rich tradition of rewarding measures put in place
to tackle more or less general criminal phenomena (or perceived as such), as
well as to resolve more or less emergency situations (or perceived as such).
Let us begin, however, by saying that “reward measures” and “emer-
gency” are not always superimposable terms, at least if observed from a his-
torical point of view: from a broader look, in fact, it emerges that this was so
only in the last period of the “fight” against banditry and then in the fight
against the internal political-ideological terrorism. Without going too far
back in time, legal historians point out that the rewarding logic has long
been the sign of the privatisation of the medieval ius terribile and, at least in
the pre-enlightenment era, of the advancement of a utilitarian method that
* § 1-1.2, 2-2.5 and 3 written by Francesco Diamanti. § 1-1.3.5.1 and 4 written by
Francesco Rossi. § 2.6-2.9 written by Giulia Ducoli. This national report was finalised after
the first Italian Focus Group “Terrorismo e misure premiali”, which took place at the Law
Department of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE). The authors would
like to thank all the speakers and participants for their valuable insights.
differs from and is older than the English method, more oriented to the en-
forcement of the timeless reason of State. All this, in fact, can be seen rather
well in the development of the legislation of the pre-unitary liberal states
against banditry; this is a problem that is typical of our pre-industrial soci-
ety and, at least in part, a direct product of criminal law. Terminologically,
banditry indicates the existence of bandits, i.e., human beings “banned” due
to either a political decision made by a small community or by choice of a
court “…vested with the authority to ban”.
Effectively described as “… a catalyst of different and even opposing in-
stances […] a container of various humanity […] a witness of serious con-
tradictions within society, in impatience, discomfort, rebellion or common
criminal routine”, this is a problem “Italian” society only began to become
(more or less) aware of in the 15th century. Of course: crime and bandits,
even though they arouse fear amongst the population, became real objects of
the criminal policy of the States of the Ancien Régime only in so far as they
knocked on the doors of the cities, given that “… the great fragmentation of
“public opinion” (and, more precisely, its non-existence) did not allow for
the formation of fully defined criminal stereotypes”. Law historians speak of
“bandits” and “banditry” (as a “general” criminal phenomenon) only due to
the specific routes of enlistment and the control they were able to exercise
over the rural population, not because they were so perceived by those pop-
ulations.
The characteristic traits of the first bandits – among the most recent
ones, that will become the bandits of the 19th century – only began to be
studied in the 16th century. Against those criminals, “bounties” and im-
punity, subsidies, rewards and attenuations, designed to induce the citizen
(or the criminal him/herself) to find the latrones, with good peace of mind of
the first disquisitions of Cesare Beccaria on the immorality of bounties, con-
centrated on the idea that “… those who have the strength to defend them-
selves do not try to buy it […]. Now the laws invite betrayal, and now they
punish it”. The rewards created mistrust amongst accomplices, who could
no longer trust each other: as was effectively written, in the Ancien Régime
“… the fight against banditry becomes a fight between bandits; the spring
that triggers the mechanisms, that lubricates the devices, is the reward”. At
the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, the reward tools often recur: in the
Republic of Genoa, for example, the De premio occidentis rebellem became
the first legislative instrument to combat criminals; just as the “reward” was
fundamental to counter the activity of very dangerous and very famous ban-
dits such as Marco Sciarra, who was betrayed by his lieutenant Battistella in
exchange for a pardon.
Although central, in the Italian states of that time, the expedients in mi-
tius did not only have positive reflections, but rather the opposite; the major
problems (although not the only ones, of course) for example, were raised at
a theoretical level. The prevalence of retribution and the incessant need in
the Old Regime to do justice clashed with the need to derogate by reward-
ing: however, politicians were overcompensated and jurists ignored the
problem. “At the basis was the contrast: between politics and law, legal logic
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and exercise of power, criminal geometry and quies publica. Politicians must
know how to swallow the bitter chalice of unworthiness, jurists cannot ad-
mit too striking antinomies and then be silent or almost silent”. The search
for public peace, however, flattened the contrasts and managed the embar-
rassments only from a theoretical point of view, whilst in the trials every-
thing changed and the rewards became expedients to hit the criminal hard,
whether collaborating or not. It will suffice to recall the long-existing dis-
cussion and the frankly disconcerting results for observers of our time, on
the existence, or not, for the court, of a legal obligation to keep the (reward-
ing) promise made to the whistleblower.
With the exception of certain types of reward measures structurally
linked to the offence (such as, for example, those contained in Article 56 of
the Criminal Code), in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, reward measures were generally not used for the prevention of criminal
phenomena. For their mass diffusion, it would be necessary to await the ide-
ological (“red” and “black”) terrorism of the 1970’s1.
1.1. Socio-political reasons
From a socio-political point of view and without pushing the analysis
beyond the 20th century, “reward measures” were introduced in a very spe-
cific period, which became known as the “years of disquiet”. The 1950s were
characterised by political and economic changes of immense importance: in
addition to the abrupt transition from fascist dictatorship to republican
democracy, Italy at that time was faced, for the first time, with a market
economy open to international competition. Italy’s growth (economic and
cultural) was too rapid; it did not leave time for society to adapt to all these
great changes: it suffices to reflect on the fact that, from 1955 to 1963, Ital-
ian society went from mainly agricultural to mainly industrial politics, all
this without trade union experience, often without education, etc. The logic
of competition infiltrated all aspects of society. Individualism attempted, for
the first time (albeit slowly), to spread to the population, with consequent
erosion of traditional values and ties. In the same way, serious and pressing
migratory flows from the south to the north of Italy began and the exploita-
tion of the weak social groups (amongst them, especially workers) almost
immediately took over, generating great outrage amongst politicians and
young people growing up. It is certainly no coincidence that perhaps the
most significant terrorist organisation – the Red Brigades – was formed
within the Emilian Communist Party, within the University of Trento and
amongst the workers of some factories in the north. As it has already been
mentioned, in 20th Century the (re)birth of the reward measures is indissol-
ubly tied to internal ideological terrorism; or rather, to internal ideological
terrorisms. The plural is a must, given that, alongside the terrorism of the
extreme left, there was that of the extreme right and both sides contained
1 For more details, see A. SPATARO, Judiciary and institutions during the “years of lead”: a
virtuous model, in this Volume.
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within them various different criminal organisations. In turn, ideological
terrorism, at least at an internal level, can be explained by the changes
(above all, political and economic) that are typical of the aforementioned
decade.
1.2. Legislative evolution
With the exception of some more classic provisions (e.g., the already
mentioned Article 56 of the Italian Criminal Code), the Italian legislator has
experimented with the reward logic in the Special Section, on kidnapping
for extortion (Article 630 of the Italian Criminal Code). It must be antici-
pated that, originally, this provision imposed a very severe penalty for kid-
napping for the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or others, an unjust profit
as the price of release (aggravated by the achievement of the criminal in-
tent). As a result of sadly known events, in 1974, a reward consisting of the
reduction of the legal margin (on the “model” of art. 605) following the re-
lease of the victim without redemption was included.
“Rewards” are dealt with in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 630 of the
Italian Criminal Code and dissociation is a must (only the dissociated, even
all, can be rewarded, others cannot), but it is not enough. It is also necessary
(i) to ensure that the person is bought back his freedom without ransom; (ii)
to ensure that the criminal activity does not lead to further consequences;
(iii) to provide practical assistance to the judicial or police authorities in
gathering evidence that is decisive for the detection or capture of accom-
plices.
In addition to the individual case-law developments resulting from
these changes, one characteristic immediately comes to mind: in the first
two cases, the conduct that the perpetrator must maintain has a correlation
with the harmfulness expressed by the offence committed. The third case,
being completely “eccentric and uneven with respect to the plan of the
harmfulness”, is not placed in protection of the legal interest of “personal
freedom”, but finalised to the repression of the single offence, at least if
multi-subjective. However, it is still mainly oriented to the single fact, not to
dismantle a hypothetical criminal association, red or black terrorism, mafia,
etc., nor against a general phenomenon (organised crime, terrorism, corrup-
tion, etc.).
On the “model” of reward introduced in the kidnapping of a person for
the purpose of extortion or terrorism (Article 630, paragraphs 3 and 4 and
289-bis, paragraph 4, of the Italian Criminal Code), in the middle of a social
situation that was quite unstable and characterised by tragic attacks, the
Legislator then intervened (also) with expedients in mitius finalised to the
promotion of the “dissociation” and “collaboration” of the terrorist type.
The first discipline to analyse, in this context, is the one contained in
the “Cossiga Law” (1980). The significant tightening of sanctions (the
“stick”, Article 1, 2 and 3 of Decree Law No. 625 dated 15 December 1979)
and very important procedural interventions (Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 thereof)
were accompanied by favourable treatments (the “carrot”, Articles 4 and 5).
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Some insights. The purpose of these last two articles, of a reward nature and
structure, is very clear: to avoid the naturalistic event and to clarify the fact
by ensuring impunity to those who prevent the event and collaborate with
the authorities to reconstruct it, as well as to track down any accomplices.
The saving on the disvalue of the result (having prevented the event) is cen-
tral, but by itself rightly insufficient for the non punishability. It should
therefore be noted that the structure of the provision-reward referred to in
Article 5 of the Decree Law under analysis begins by excluding the cases of
active withdrawal: if the perpetrator, even without dissociating himself, vol-
untarily withdraws from any intentional crime (preventing the event), he ob-
tains a mitigation, even very significant, of the punishment; if a terrorist
does so, he obtains impunity, provided that he collaborates to reconstruct
the facts and to ensure that any accomplices are brought to justice. To un-
derstand the relationship between these two provisions, a general provision
(Article 56 Criminal Code) and a special provision (Article 5 of Decree Law
No. 8 of 1991), it is necessary to specify the following: on the one hand,
upon first reading, it seems that this non-punishability-reward can only
work in the case of terrorism-related criminal offences which contemplate
events that do not coincide with the “typical” one (e.g., in case of crimes ag-
gravated by the event), whilst in all the other cases (also unrelated to terror-
ism, and not excluding a balancing with other circumstances) Article 56,
paragraph 4, of the Italian Criminal Code would apply. From a systematic
point of view, to all intents and purposes, this seems to work, but legitimate
results are not well balanced from a political-criminal point of view: it would
be better, instead, to identify the scope of application of the withdrawal-re-
ward (non-punishability) only to crimes attempted in matters of terrorism
and subversion.
Another problem (significant for the reward logic as a whole and also
related to the formulation of Article 5) touches on the understanding of the
adjective “determined”, referring to the evidence that the author, after hav-
ing voluntarily prevented the event (even without dissociating), must provide
to the authority to reconstruct the fact and to identify any accomplices. Ra-
tionally, there is no doubt that a “decisive” evidence is only the “indispens-
able” evidence for achieving the goal; if this is the case, the task of the col-
laborator is to be rather punctual: if the accomplice voluntarily prevents the
event and collaborates by providing indispensable information, but (shortly
before) already provided by others without his knowledge, he is in trouble
and can only hope that the information given will complement each other.
This is not the place to discuss all these problems in depth, but to re-
port their existence is more than enough. Lastly, it should be noted that the
two provisions discussed above have been included in the Italian Criminal
Code in Article 270-bis 1 of the Italian Criminal Code, by Article 5 of Leg-
islative Decree No. 21 dated 1 March 2018, No. 21 concerning “Provisions
implementing the principle of delegation of the code reserve in criminal
matters pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 85, section q) of Law No. 103 dated
23 June 2017”.
We shall now move on.
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Also, worth noting is the well-known “law on penitents” (especially Ar-
ticles 1, 2, 3 and 5); a legislative intervention in which the “rewards” have
been prepared in defence of the constitutional order and when the stakes (at
least on paper) are so high there are no limits to the do ut des. Radical “non-
punishability” for the terrorist who dissolves or contributes to the dissolu-
tion of the association, or withdraws from the agreement or surrenders
without resistance or abandoning his weapons and provides (in any case) all
the information he has on the structure and organisation of the association.
Timing is important: everything must take place before the final sentence is
pronounced. If this happens, except as provided for in Article 289-bis of the
Italian Criminal Code, the penalty of life imprisonment is replaced by im-
prisonment from fifteen to twenty-one years and the other penalties are re-
duced by a third. For the individual accused of one or more crimes commit-
ted for the purposes of terrorism or subversion of the constitutional system
that maintain one of the collaborative conducts described above and that
make, at any stage or degree of the trial, full confession of all the crimes
committed, effectively working to elude or mitigate the harmful or danger-
ous consequences of the crime, or to prevent the commission of related
crimes pursuant to Article 61, No. 2 of the Italian Criminal Code, the penalty
cannot in any case exceed fifteen years of imprisonment. Even the rigidity of
the irreducible can give way: to obtain the attenuation-reward they must
confess and activate in various ways; there is no alternative.
It is clear that the structure of the discipline under analysis derives in
part from Article 62 No. 6 of the Italian Criminal Code and in part from Ar-
ticle 4 of Legislative Decree No. 625 dated 15 December 1979 (converted by
Law No. 15 dated 6 February 1980). Here repentance is broad; the choice
that the perpetrator has before him to reach the reward is full of practicable
ways: avoid harmful or dangerous consequences, avoid future crimes, etc.
There is a hindrance of choice, but the fluidity and the few obstacles to the
reward must be compensated for by the effectiveness of the alleged conduct.
A “seriousness of intent capable of achieving the goal” is barely enough.
Moving on to Article 3 of the law under discussion, we note some miti-
gating circumstances for those who, also before the final sentence of convic-
tion, behave in one of the ways provided for in Article 1, paragraphs 1 and
2, as well as making a full confession of all the crimes committed, helping
the police or the judicial authority in the collection of evidence that is “deci-
sive” for the identification or capture of one or more perpetrators of crimes
committed “… for the same purpose”, or provides evidence relevant to the
exact reconstruction of the fact and the discovery of the perpetrators.
The formulas, here also, more or less repeat themselves; there are some
peculiarities, however.
The first, which is highly significant, is the use of the concept of “per-
petrators of crimes committed for the same purpose” instead of “accom-
plices”. In this way, it is possible to benefit from the reward by providing aid
(not precisely described and free from the requirement of concreteness) in
the identification or capture of other terrorists, even if it does not necessar-
ily strictly an accomplice of the cooperator. This time, therefore, the reward
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is intended to eradicate the terrorist organisation as a whole; it is freed from
obligatory connections with the crime, or with the crimes, for which pro-
ceedings are instituted.
Under Article 3, in order to benefit from the reward, the terrorist de-
fendant may (alternatively) provide evidence relevant to the exact recon-
struction of the fact and the discovery of the perpetrators. Something does
not add up: the effort, in this second case, is much less than that previously
analysed, but the reward is the same. However, if so, why should the defen-
dant choose the longest and most complex route to the same place? This, in
fact, is not the case. A careful reading of the provision reveals that the legis-
lator has contemplated the two conducts not as alternatives, but as sub-
sidiary and with spatially diversified effects: only if the defendant cannot
carry out the first conduct (which would mitigate all the contested offences)
can he gain access to the same reward; only in that case can he limit himself
to providing evidence relevant to the exact reconstruction of the fact and the
discovery of the perpetrators.
Articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 304 dated 29 May 1982 provide (both) for
full confession of all crimes committed as an essential requirement for the
awarding of the “reward”. However, what are “all crimes committed”? Is it
also necessary to confess an old theft or sexual assault that is completely un-
related to terrorism and subversion? In our opinion, absolutely not, because
if the reward follows the purpose of combating terrorism, then only the ter-
rorist experience of the offender can be considered pertinent and relevant.
The reward does not mitigate the position of the accused on the basis of the
existence of a confession-sacrifice, but on the basis of important help in
combating a serious and highly dangerous criminal phenomenon. Other-
wise, very trivially, it would suffice to confess some old mischief, some crim-
inally relevant fact, perhaps prescribed or non-existent; this, of course,
would not be serious.
Domestic terrorism was not only composed of obstinate leaders and
perpetrators, endowed with marked criminal resistance, but also of a more
or less vast number of young men and women, who, fascinated by the idea
of the armed revolution, had fallen into the quicksand of crime and had
managed to get out of it definitively and, in some rare cases, even deeply un-
derstanding the gravity of what they had done, the pain they had caused to
other human beings. In addition to irreducible individuals, in other words,
there were also dissociated individuals and Law No. 34 dated February 18,
1987 was designed (mostly) for them. According to the letter of the law un-
der discussion, the dissociated terrorist, in fact, is the one who “accused or
condemned for crimes of terrorism or subversion of the constitutional order,
has definitively abandoned the terrorist or subversive organisation or move-
ment to which he belonged, jointly holding the following conduct: admission
of the activities effectively carried out, behaviour objectively and univocally
inconsistent with the persistence of the associative bond, repudiation of vio-
lence as a method of political struggle”. The dissociated person enjoys bene-
fits, at least until he or she reoffends or engages in conduct that is not con-
sistent with dissociation (Article 5 Law No. 34 dated 18 February 1987).
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Lastly, it is specified that the legislation in question was applicable only
to crimes committed, or the permanence of which ceased, by 31 December
1983 (Article 8, Law No. 34 dated 18 February 1987).
1.3. Case-law evolution. Substantive criminal law profiles: an overview of the
temporal validity, the scope and the requirements of rewarding measures
An overview of the Italian case law shows a gradual decrease in the im-
plementation of counterterrorism rewarding measures. The following sec-
tions will sum up the judgments delivered from the 1980s until the 2000s. By
showing a certain similarity with other fields (e.g., illicit production and
trafficking of drugs, organised crime, etc.), Italian case law on rewarding
measures firstly clarifies their scope and the kind of cooperation required.
1.3.1. The sequence of rewarding laws with different temporal effects and the
issue regarding the validity of the “Cossiga Law”
The rapid succession of both permanent and time-limited rewarding
laws required to ascertain whether the laws adopted in 1982 and 1987 im-
plicitly repealed all or part of the “Cossiga Law”.
The first Court of Cassation’s rulings acknowledged that the “Cossiga
Law” had been repealed. In the Algranati case2, the Supreme Court ruled
that the Law No. 304 of 25 May 1982 had done so implicitly, as it ruled the
same subject matter as Article 4 of the Law No. 15 of 6February 1980. Ac-
cording to the Court, the 1982 law had regulated entirely ex novo the matter
of the rewards to be granted to those who dissociate themselves from ter-
rorist and subversive organisations and cooperate, in various forms, with the
investigating authorities.
Afterwards, the Court of Cassation overruled Algranati3. The Sixth Sec-
tion of the Supreme Court ruled that notwithstanding the “Cossiga Law” of
1980 and the “law on repentants” of 1982 rule the same subject matter, they
do not overlap with regard to crimes committed after 31 December 19824.
1.3.2. The scope of application
With regard to Article 4 of the “Cossiga Law”, the Court of Cassation
ruled that the mitigating circumstance provided for therein applied to any
terrorist or subversive crime “committed by the defendant who dissociates
himself from an organised group and fully collaborates with judicial author-
ities”5. Evidence of an established and consistent criminal plan, as well as
the existence of a connection between the crime the defendant is prosecuted
for and those he or she is cooperating for, are mandatory6.
2 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 10 May 1993; CP, 1995, 53.
3 Judgment of 17 June 2007, No. 38260, B.; CP, 2008, 1327.
4 Court of Cassation, B, cit., p. 30-31.
5 Court of Cassation, B., cit.
6 Court of Cassation, B., cit.
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The Court of Cassation has ruled that rewarding mitigating circum-
stances also apply when collaboration concerns other suspects who have
nothing to do with the crime the collaborating defendant is charged for. The
collaborator can be rewarded also for helping to identify or capture individ-
uals who were not involved in the crimes committed7.
Conversely, if the collaborator is charged for more than one crime and
provides truthful, complete, decisive, or useful information to the judicial
authority, the issue concerning the applicability of rewarding measures to
crimes connected with those collaboration is provided for is controversial.
In a case regarding the murder of Marco Biagi, the Court of Appeal of
Bologna ruled out that the mitigating circumstance provided for by Article 4
of the “Cossiga Law” could include all the crimes the defendant was being
prosecuted for. Arguably, the wording of Article 4 grants the special mitigat-
ing circumstance provided for therein with respect exclusively to the specific
crime (or crimes) for which cooperation is provided. The Court of Appeal
ruled that the rewarding mitigating circumstance does not apply to other of-
fences, albeit connected.
Admittedly, the Court of Cassation overruled the latter decision, in that
not applying rewarding mitigating circumstances to connected offences in-
fringes the rationale of the law. The goal of rewarding legislations is to dis-
rupt terrorist activities. Against this background, the connection amongst
crimes committed is within a unitary criminal plan expands the mitigating
effects of collaboration on criminal sentences8.
1.3.3. Collaboration
In order to apply rewarding measures, the Italian case law requires co-
operation to be decisive, complete, and truthful.
The Court of Cassation has clarified the meaning of “decisive”. This cri-
terion intends to restrictive the application of rewarding measures. Cooper-
ation is decisive insofar as not just useful, but rather conclusive contribution
to achieve the goals pursued by the criminal investigation, is provided. Ac-
cording to such a restrictive interpretation, cooperation with a view to col-
lecting further evidence and ascertaining criminal responsibilities is not to
be qualified as decisive, to the extent that accomplices are already identi-
fied9.
In other cases, the Court of Cassation has interpreted the “law on re-
pentants” No. 304 of 29 May 1982 more broadly with respect to the required
efficacy of collaboration. The information provided shall be complete, rele-
vant and useful (rather than decisive).
Undoubtedly, the relevance and usefulness of collaboration varies de-
pending upon manifold objective and subjective circumstances. That is to
7 Court of Cassation., judgment of 14 November 1985, Andriani; CP, 1987, 1109.
8 Court of Cassation, B., cit., in particular p. 26 and 34. Formerly, among the District
Courts’ case law, see Court of Padua, judgment of 26 July 1980, Rigami; Assise Court of
Genoa, judgment of 3 October 1985, Faranda.
9 Court of Cassation, judgment of 18 March 1994, Bernardoni, CP 1996, 119; judgment
of 14 April 1993, Soave, CP 1995, 71.
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say, case by case, each defendant is able to provide information of different
procedural relevance. Against this background, the Italian case law ac-
knowledged that the burden to provide adequate information is fulfilled
even if the defendant who knew little, due to his or her marginal role, dis-
closed all the other information without reticence10. Therefore, arguably, the
minimum threshold to apply rewarding legislation to cases of useful cooper-
ation varies case-by-case.
However, the Italian case law does not grant relevance to “merely as-
sertive contributions” or “subjective states”11: for instance, if the statements
only reaffirm or add details to other statements that have already been ob-
tained aliunde. Conversely, if the actual efficacy of collaboration is dimin-
ished by causes that do not depend on the collaborator, a broad interpreta-
tion acknowledged that rewarding legislation applies to contributions that
are objectively suitable to produce foreseeable and desirable investigative
and procedural results. According to this interpretation, the reward applies
even if such result is not eventually produced in case external factors that
did not depend upon the post delictum behaviour of the defendant occurred.
A different and strict interpretation maintains the opposite and applies re-
warding measures only insofar as the expected results are met12.
Over time, the broad interpretation has prevailed. With reference to
preventing the criminal activity from having further consequences, the Court
of Cassation assessed the “potential suitability” of cooperation “to achieve a
tangible result”13.
Lastly, the statements and information must be truthful. Considering
the aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court on the Marco Biagi case14,
one might infer that truthful, absolutely loyal and complete collaboration is
needed to prove the disengagement of the accomplice from the criminal net-
work and activities15.
The judgement at hand also defines disengagement itself16 as the fact of
breaking with the criminal environment and abandoning terrorist goals17.
Ten years earlier, the Court of Cassation found the “joint conditions for […]
disengagement” in the “disclosure of the activities” and in the clear and ex-
plicit “rejection of violence as a method of political struggle”18.
In presence of the requirements described in the previous sections,
Courts must grant the rewarding measure19 even if aggravating circum-
10 Assise Court of Genoa, judgment 5 January 1987, Revello, in RP, 1987, 341; Court of
Cassation, judgment of 21 January 1986, Sovente, in RP, 1987, 487; Court of Cassation, judg-
ment of 11 March 1985, Solimeno, in RP, 1986, 429; Court of Cassation, judgment of 17
March 1986, Cattaneo, in RP, 1987, 877.
11 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 35.
12 Court of Cassation, Algranati, cit.
13 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 35.
14 Court of Cassation, B., cit.
15 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 27.
16 See paragraph 1.3.3.
17 Court of Cassation, B., cit., p. 34.
18 Section V, judgment No. 1801 of 22 January 1997, Bompressi e altri.
19 See Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment No. 4906 of 27 October 1988, Atzeni.
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stances apply20. With reference to Article 2 of Law No. 34 of 18 February
1987, the Supreme Court argued that cooperation triggers a rebuttable pre-
sumption of disengagement. Moreover, if all the objective requirements es-
tablished by the law are met, rewarding measures shall apply at the sen-
tencing phase automatically21.
1.3.4. The concepts of “disengagement” and “outstanding relevance”: objective
vs subjective interpretation
Notably, as regards the meaning of “disengagement”, the case law of the
Court of Cassation has adopted dissenting objective and subjective interpre-
tations. According to the objective, disengagement means usefully contribut-
ing in such a way that is logically antithetical to the collaborator’s member-
ship in the terrorist organisation and his or her engagement in its criminal
activity.
According to the subjective, disengagement necessarily implies also an
inner repentance. The latter must arise concretely and unequivocally from
the conduct of the collaborator, considering notably the subjective post fac-
tum criteria set out by Article 133 of the Italian Criminal Code to assess the
criminal attitude of the convicted.
The clash between objective and subjective interpretations emerges also
with reference to the contributions of outstanding relevance. Notwithstand-
ing, arguably, the objective standpoint prevails. To assess the outstanding im-
portance of the contribution, the Court considers the procedural result that
the statements and information produced or at least their concrete suitabil-
ity to achieve the goals pursued by the law22. The subjective standpoint23
does not comply with the material nature of the contribution of exceptional
relevance nor with the rationale of rewarding legislation in the rule of law.
1.3.5. The post-conviction phase: the special regime of conditional release
As for the post-conviction phase, the Italian case law addressed inter-
pretative issues concerning the granting of conditional release.
In the judgment No. 189 of 23 May 1995 (Mallardo), the Constitutional
Court found a discrepancy between the purpose of ordinary conditional re-
lease and that of special conditional release for terrorist offences, which is
treated as a reward for cooperation with judicial authorities (law of 29 May
1982, No. 304, Articles 8 and 9). The latter Article granted the power to re-
voke conditional release sine die, thus preventing ancillary criminal sanc-
tions and other effects provided for by law to be extinguished. The Constitu-
tional Court acknowledged that the special conditional release regime un-
reasonably distinguished between two different categories of offenders
(notably, ordinary criminals and terrorists) and pursued mere deterrence,
20 See Court of Cassation, judgment of 18 December 1987, Berardi.
21 See Court of Cassation, Atzeni, cit.
22 See Court of Cassation, Solimeno, cit.
23 See the Bettini case: Court of Cassation, judgment of 26 February 1985.
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rather than also social rehabilitation. However, the Court rejected the appli-
cation. Although the breach of Articles 3 (equal treatment) and 27 (social re-
habilitation) of the Constitution could be maintained in abstracto, the Con-
stitutional Court argued that the exceptional nature of special conditional
release could not allow to compare its rules to those on ordinary conditional
release, in the absence of an adequate tertium comparationis24.
1.3.5.1. Objective and subjective meanings of “repentant”; protection of victims
of terrorist crimes; seriousness of the offence, dangerousness and crim-
inal attitude of the offender
With respect to the post-sentencing phase, the most relevant case law
concerns the meaning of “repentance” for granting special parole. In the
Acanfora case25, the Court of Cassation ruled that unequivocal proof of a
shown repentance, as a “change of life resulting from the acknowledgement
of errors or faults” on the ethical-moral level, is required. In other words, the
“repentant” must internally assume the “collective values” that had been
breached. According to Acanfora, the offender cannot have repented and be
dangerous at the same time. Such inner root of repentance is to be ascer-
tained regarding both prison and non-prison conduct.
Against this background, differences between objective and subjective
meanings of repentance reappear.
According to the objective meaning, the inner sphere of the “repentant”
and the adherence to the values expressed by the institutional and legal
framework is irrelevant for the purposes of granting special parole. Such
principle also applies with respect to the facts the offender is sentenced
for26. “Repentance” is matched with social rehabilitation: its evidence shall
be inferred from the overall conduct, and the latter shall enable to predict
that the individual will not reoffend27. In other rulings, the Court of Cassa-
tion requires to verify an evolution of the personality of the offender towards
socially adequate models of life28.
The case law takes also into account the need to protect victims of ter-
rorism. The Court of Cassation attempted to strike a balance between objec-
tive and subjective understandings of “repentance” by requiring: i) adher-
ence to the ethical and social values that have been breached by the crime
committed; ii) satisfaction of the needs of the victims, notably restoration of
the damages and other consequences of the crime, as well as assistance and
24 Constitutional Court, Mallardo, cit., § 2.
25 Section I, judgment of October 8 1990, No. 3235.
26 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 11 March 1997; Court of Cassation, Sec-
tion I, judgment of 10 December 2004.
27 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 25 September 2015, No. 486; Section I,
judgment of 10 December 2004, cit.; Section I, judgment of 11 March 1997, cit.; Section I,
judgment of 26 June 1995; Section I, judgment of 26 March 1992; Section V, judgment of 18
December 1991.
28 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 21 June 2001; Section I, judgment of 6
November 1989; Section I, judgment of 7 April 1993; Section I, judgment of 13 May 1991;
judgment of 19 November 1990.
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other means of solidarity29. Notwithstanding, victims’ failure to forgive the
offender is not an obstacle to granting special conditional release30.
As regards the assessment carried out to grant conditional release, the
Court of Cassation considered the mere absence of signs of dangerousness to
be insufficient. To this effect, positive and tangible markers towards social re-
habilitation are necessary31. Likewise, in some cases the Supreme Court ar-
gued that the mere regular prison conduct of the offender does not suffice32.
According to the subjective meaning, in order to grant special condi-
tional release, evidence of moral redemption, a critical review of the of-
fender’s past life and an aspiration to social reintegration are necessary33.
Likewise, some rulings of the Supreme Court required markers of the ac-
knowledgement of moral blame34. Moreover, according to some rulings
which combined objective and subjective understandings of “repentance”,
dedication to work and voluntary activities and the critical review of past
criminal conducts do not suffice in the absence of a both moral (including
by means of requests for forgiveness) and material interest in restoring vic-
tims of the crime committed.
The case law of the Court of Cassation in the field of special conditional
release displays dissenting interpretations regarding the relevance of the
crime the “repentant” committed and his or her criminal attitude35. The
Supreme Court resolved this divergence by means of an intermediate inter-
pretation, according to which the seriousness of the offence and the crimi-
nal attitude of the offender are relevant in the initial phase of the assess-
ment. The latter must be integrated with the rigorous verification of repen-
tance considering all the other markers available during the enforcement of
the sentence36.
2. Current rewarding legislation (where existing)
From an experiential rather than normative point of view, we have at
least two “rules”, which are well known in the Italian doctrinal and judicial
panorama. The first is that to defeat internal political-ideological terrorism –
29 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 16 January 2007; Section I, judgment of
15 February 2008.
30 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 18 May 2005; Section I, judgment of 11
May 1993.
31 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 23 November 1990.
32 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 9 March 2005; Section I, judgment of 4
October 1991.
33 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 11 July 2014, No. 45042; Section I, judg-
ment of 17 July 2012, No. 34946; Section I, judgment of 4 February 2009; Section I, judg-
ment of 26 March 1992; judgment of 3 December 1990; Section I, judgment of 19 February
2009; Section I, judgment of 26 September 2007; Court of Turin, judgment of 10 June 2009.
34 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 29 May 2009; Section I, judgment of 9
March 2005.
35 See Court of Cassation, judgment of 9 May 1988; Section I, judgment of 11 January
1985; judgment of 24 February 1983; Section I, judgment of 29 May 1978; contra, Section I,
judgment of 11 May 1993; Section I, judgment of 5 July 1982; judgment of 27 April 1982.
36 Court of Cassation, Section I, judgment of 28 April 2005; Section I, judgment of 7
October 1992; judgment of 27 June 1990.
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therefore, a series of criminal organisations that use pseudonyms or pass-
words to communicate, as well as paramilitary techniques to act – repres-
sion, however essential, is not enough. Either there were informers ready to
cooperate with the judicial authority or the jurisdiction must, sooner or
later, lay down its arms. The difference in information characterising the re-
lations between the State, on the one side, and the members of terrorist as-
sociations of an ideological matrix, on the other, increases the likelihood of
the former to fail; but to be informed, penitents are needed. The second
“rule” is that reward measures, if used temporarily and for the sole purpose
of countering truly emergency phenomena, could be the right antidote to
moderate the cognitive gap we have just mentioned, without giving up too
much of some essential guarantees of the weaker party in the proceedings
(the defendant)37. The most serious problem is that the “reward measures”
that Italy has experienced over time of ideological terrorism have remained
largely operational, contributing to the sad phenomenon (widespread not
only in Italy) of the normalisation of the emergency.
From a regulatory point of view, in extreme summary, it can be said
that, out of the reward measures against terrorism, the profile of reduction
(and in some cases, extinction) of the penalty granted pursuant to Articles 4
and 5 of the so-called “Cossiga Law” (Law No. 15 of 1980) primarily re-
mained, being applicable only to the repentant terrorist who intends to co-
operate. This is, as has been properly specified, the “cornerstone of the
counter-terrorism reward strategy”.
The extenuating circumstances referred to in Article 4 are excluded
from the logic of balancing with the aggravating circumstances pursuant to
Article 69 of the Italian Criminal Code and there is no discretion: if the con-
ditions are met, the court must grant them. From a strictly systematic point
of view, however, it remains complicated to frame them: given that their sub-
stantial content results in an active dissociation that affects the sanction but
does not touch the “fact”, nor does it really help to understand it, some
scholars have spoken of improper circumstances or have even come to deny
their circumstantial nature altogether.
Article 5, on the other hand, is nothing more than a special case of
withdrawal-reward (case of non-punishability), the operation of which must
be limited only to the context of the attempted crime.
Once convicted, the possibility of obtaining prison benefits and alter-
native measures to imprisonment remains despite the presence of Article 4-
bis of the Italian Prison System (which denies them, as a “general rule”, also
to terrorists): also in this case, if the offender dissociates and cooperates, he
can access the benefits during the enforcement of the sentence, otherwise he
is foreclosed. Let us recall that Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System has
been reformed by Article 3 of Law No. 38 dated 13 April 2009, on the “Con-
version into law, with amendments, of Decree-Law No. 11 dated 23 February
2009 on urgent measures concerning public safety and the fight against sex-
ual violence, as well as persecutory acts”.
37 Voir A. SPATARO, Magistratura ed Istituzioni negli “anni di piombo”: un modello virtu-
oso, cit.
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This law has divided the article into four paragraphs, which we can
summarise as follows. Assignment to outside work, reward permits and al-
ternative measures to imprisonment provided for in Chapter VI, excluding
early release, may be granted to detainees and prisoners for certain serious
crimes – including those of terrorism – only and exclusively if they have
taken action to prevent the crime from causing further consequences, to se-
cure evidence of the crimes, to identify any accomplices or to seize the sums
or other benefits transferred.
There is a “shock absorber”, a mechanism capable of attenuating, in
some cases, the system of foreclosures described above. This happens in the
event in which elements are acquired such as to rule out a connection of the
perpetrator with the terrorist association or if the limited participation in
the criminal act (ascertained in the sentence of conviction) renders a useful
collaboration with the justice impossible; or, in conclusion, if the collabora-
tion offered was irrelevant, or if the mitigating circumstances provided for
in Article 62, No. 6, of the Italian Criminal Code, 114 and 116, paragraph 2,
of the Italian Criminal Code have been granted (in the sentence).
The absence of evidence regarding the existence of current connections
with a certain type of crime (e.g., terrorism), is decisive for the granting of
benefits also to detainees or prisoners for other crimes expressly provided
for by Article 1-ter of the provision, as well as for some crimes against the
person, specifically against individual personality (e.g., Articles 600-bis, 600-
ter of the Italian Criminal Code, etc.) and personal freedom (e.g., Articles
609-bis, 609-ter of the Italian Criminal Code, etc.). In the latter cases dictated
in paragraph 1-quater, however, prison benefits may be granted to detainees
and prisoners also on the basis of the results of scientific observation of the
individual conducted collectively for at least one year, including with the
participation of experts (pursuant to Article 80 paragraph 4 of the Italian
Prison System).
The rewarding nature of the system, of course, does not end here: al-
though it is off topic here, it should be remembered that the Italian legal sys-
tem also proceeds in this sense by other means, such as administrative
means (e.g., protection measures granted to informants) pursuant to Article
9, paragraph 3, of Law Decree No. 8 dated 15 January 1991, (converted in
Law No. 82 dated 15 March 1991 and subsequent amendments).
2.1. Applicability conditions
For crimes committed for the purposes of terrorism or subversion of
the democratic order, Article 4 of the “Cossiga law” allows the perpetrator to
take advantage of various “rewards” (not punishability and serious reduction
of the penalty).
The reduction in sentence (mitigating circumstances: life imprisonment
is replaced by imprisonment from twelve to twenty years and other sen-




– the activation to prevent the criminal activity leading to further conse-
quences;
– the concrete help provided to the judicial authority in gathering decisive
evidence to identify or capture accomplices.
“Non punishability”, on the other hand, requires:
– having prevented the damaging event;
– the provision of decisive evidence for the exact reconstruction of the
event and to identify any accomplices.
As regards the reward profile during enforcement, Article 4-bis of the
Italian Prison System subjects the granting of prison benefits in the event of
a crime for the purposes of terrorism or subversion to the presence of the
conditions specified either by Article 58-ter of the Italian Prison System or
by Article 323-bis of the Italian Criminal Code. The alternative conditions
are as follows:
– having taken action (even after conviction) to prevent the criminal ac-
tivity from leading to further consequences;
– having concretely assisted the police or judicial authority in the collec-
tion of decisive elements for the reconstruction of the events and for the identi-
fication or capture of the perpetrators.
2.2. Types of rewarding measures
The classification of rewarding measures is not easy.
A possible macro-breakdown could be made between “rewards” that
follow conduct capable of affecting the offence (even in part) and “rewards”
that are awarded as a result of conduct that does not interfere in any way
with it.
In the first group, it is possible to include the more classic cases re-
ferred to in Article 56 of the Italian Criminal Code. When an action, or a
“typical” omission, has begun at least in the form of an attempt, it is in the
common interest to let the offender know that if he voluntarily desists, no
one will be able to punish him, because this information will likely stimulate
his attachment to freedom, directing – even at a rather advanced stage – his
will away from the commission of the criminal offence. Similarly, it is ap-
propriate to ensure the perpetrator of the discounts subject to a sufficient ac-
tive withdrawal to avoid commitment. Those just described, as far as it is
possible to discuss the obligatory nature and quantum of the reward (de-
pending on the “weight” that each person gives to the “disvalue of the ac-
tion”), are nothing more than the graduated reward logic of the personal and
supervened cause of non-punishment of voluntary desistance (Article 56,
paragraph 3, of the Italian Criminal Code) and the extenuating circumstance
of active withdrawal (Article 56, paragraph 4, of the Italian Criminal Code).
In addition, of course, it is not only a matter of political-criminal choices
that are free from scientific evidence: in front of the same (only attempted)
crime, in the fact of those who desist, there remains an undoubtedly lower
“disvalue of action” than that (integral) embodied by a mere withdrawal. On
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the one hand, the perpetrator almost does not materialise the work com-
pletely, on the other hand, the “fact” is almost complete (certainly the action
or omission is), even if later, if fate gives him time, he recedes by preventing
the event.
On the other hand, the second group includes reward measures that
make the reward conditional on the mere cooperation of the accused or the
offender with the judicial authorities in order to obtain useful information.
It suffices to mention, for example, the reward that for cooperation during
the enforcement of the penalty (see § 2.3???).
2.3. Rewarding measures that exclude or mitigate the penalty, initiated at the
post-sentencing stage
Reward logic is not a specific feature of substantive criminal law in the
strict sense, but also (and sometimes above all) operates in the post-sen-
tencing phase. In this way, the enforcement becomes a de facto favourable
context also for useful and efficient investigative activities, defined by some
agreeable inquisitions. Well, if we understand reward in general terms we
must also (and above all) talk about licences, reward permits, semi-freedom,
parole, etc., whilst what we want to discuss is something else. Many reward
provisions in the strict sense of the term have entered into our legal system,
mainly with Law Decree No. 152 of 1991 (converted in Law No. 203 of 1991)
and with Law Decree No. 306 of 1992 (converted in Law No. 306 of 1992).
356/1992).5
The basic logic has always been that of the “control” of the granting of
prison benefits and the worsening of the prison regime of those convicted
for mafia or terrorist crimes. If the offender cooperates, the prison system is
not differentiated (benefits are accessible), or at most can be softly differen-
tiated (benefits are partially accessible); if, on the other hand, the offender
does not cooperate (benefits are not accessible).
One such example is Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System; a central
article for the understanding of many other cases in the prison system that
allow for the differentiation mentioned above. Well, in its first formulation,
this article differentiated the granting of benefits according to whether or
not the offender had received a conviction that was in some way related to a
certain crime. In the case of serious criminal offences, the benefits were con-
ditional on the acquisition of clear evidence of the offender’s dissociation;
evidence was needed to rule out links to that specific criminality.
A few weeks after the murder of Giovanni Falcone, Law Decree No. 306
dated 8 June 1992, amended Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System, re-
quiring that, for crimes relating to organised crime, the granting of benefits
should also be subject to collaboration with the legal process pursuant to Ar-
ticle 58-ter of the Italian Prison System. The social significance of this small-
to-large legislative change was very clear; according to id quod plerumque ac-
cidit, the perpetrator-mafioso maintains firm contact with the criminal asso-
ciation; therefore, the benefit must be granted only after the incontrovertible
proof of his dissociation: tipping off. There is no turning back from betrayal:
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the legislator knows very well that “whistleblower” and “associate” are mu-
tually exclusive concepts, either one is a mafioso/terrorist or one is (forever)
a repentant whistleblower. In this way, Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison Sys-
tem, although largely unchanged from a technical point of view, is culturally
distorted or, at least, revised in its deepest meaning: from a basis for the con-
struction of a reinforced testing regime for the verification of the absence of
connections with organised crime to a disposition-incubation of informers,
collaborators, repentants.
Not to be forgotten, therefore, is Article 10 of Law No. 663 dated 10 Oc-
tober 1986, containing “Amendments to the law on the penitentiary system
and on the enforcement of custodial and liberty-restrictive measures” (the
so-called “Gozzini” law), which introduced another specific “differentiated”
regime: the events of Article 41-bis of the Italian Prison System (the so-called
hard prison) are tangible and clear evidence of this. This is, as is well known,
a model of “prison life” aimed at preventing (almost entirely) the prisoner’s
contact with the community inside and outside the institution. We then
specify that Article 41-bis of the Italian Criminal Code was subsequently
amended, with the addition of the second paragraph, by Article 19 of Law
Decree No. 306 of 1992 (converted into Law No. 356 dated 7 August 1992).
In any case, the offender subjected to such a prison regime is induced to
cooperate with the judicial authorities to discontinue that awfully hard ex-
perience. With Law Decree No. 152 dated 13 May 1991 (converted in Law
No. 203 dated 12 July 1991) Article 58-ter, which provides that the limita-
tions to the granting of benefits provided for, such as outside work, reward
permits, etc. and which we will discuss later (see § 3) was, in fact, added to
the Italian prison system. It will suffice to point out here that it is the Su-
pervisory Court, in agreement with the Public Prosecutor, that decides on
the existence of collaborative conduct.
A perhaps interesting point is the detention arrangements offered to the
collaborator. In this regard, Article 13-bis of Law No. 82 of 1991 introduced
a (not too concise) protection procedure. If the sentence is already being car-
ried out (or if it has been carried out but its enforcement has not yet begun),
in the presence of serious and urgent reasons, the Chief Appeal Court Pros-
ecutor of the Republic at the Court of Appeal in the district of which the
prison institution is located, at the request of the Chief of Police (who will
inform the Minister of the Interior), may authorise the custody of the col-
laborator in a place other than the institution where the enforcement is in
progress, for the time necessary to draw up the protection programme. If the
person is subject to an alternative measure to imprisonment (other than
early release), the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal in
the district of which the person is detained or has his residence or domicile
may authorise specific methods of enforcement of the alternative measures.
Article 13-ter, on the other hand, establishes that, for collaborators included
in a protection programme, the benefits can be arranged only after having
heard the authority that deliberated the “programme”, which must contact
the Public Prosecutor at the competent court to acquire the necessary infor-
mation on the collaboration carried out. These benefits can be provided even
beyond the penalty limits set out in the prison system.
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2.4. Counterpart of rewarding measures: the obligations of the repentant
See § 2.1.
2.5. Revocation of rewarding measures
Generally, “rewards” granted are subject to revocation. Take, by way of
example, Articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 304 dated 29 May 1982, which provide
for the full confession of all offences committed as an essential requirement
for the application of the “reward”. A very central point is that in the reali-
sation of the alleged conduct required for the granting of mitigation or non-
punishment it is better not to lie nor omit what is known. Article 10 of Law
No. 304/1982, for example, specifies that “when it appears that the cases of
non-punishability provided for in Articles 1 and 5 and the mitigating cir-
cumstances provided for in Articles 2 and 3 have been applied as a result of
false or reticent declarations, the judgement may be revised at the request of
the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal in the district of
which the judgement was passed, or of the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at
the Court of Cassation, ex officio or at the request of the Minister of Justice
[…] the court may impose a more serious penalty by specific case or quan-
tity and withdraw the benefits granted”.
2.6. Conditions for the application of the measures (procedural aspects)
In examining the procedure for the application of reward measures in
favour of those who decide to cooperate with the legal process, a distinction
must be made according to the case in point.
In the case of measures capable of affecting the an and the quantum of
the penalty such as, for example, those provided for in Article 270-bis.1 of
the Italian Criminal Code (see § 1.2), it is simply up to the court on the mer-
its, at the outcome of the proceedings, to assess the applicability of the ben-
efit according to the requirements of the law in each case.
The same will happen with reference to mitigating circumstances and
cases of non-punishability provided for in special laws and described in the
preceding paragraphs.
As regards the conditions for the applicability of such measures, it
should be noted, incidentally, that, under Article 16-quinquies of Law Decree
No. 8 of 1991, certain mitigating circumstances may be granted only to
those who – within the terms and in the manner provided for in Article 16-
quater of said decree – have signed the minutes describing the contents of
the collaboration, in which the content of the statements made by the col-
laborator is reported in detail. The descriptive report represents an instru-
ment to control the reliability of what reported by the collaborator, clarify-
ing the cognitive contribution of the declarant and outlining the boundaries
of the collaboration made38. It must be signed within a certain period to con-
38 Confirming the fact that this is a document aimed at obtaining reliable statements
are also the provisions of Article 13 of Legislative Decree No. 8 of 1991 concerning the need
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tain the phenomenon of the so-called “instalment” declarations39 and its reg-
ular formation is a prerequisite for the procedural usability of the collabora-
tor’s statements.
By subjecting the recognition of the reward to the valid formation of
the minutes, the law therefore intends to limit the discounts to the existence
of a tangible, reliable and usefully expendable collaboration in court.
Specific conditions are set out for reward measures that can be applied
during the enforcement of a possible conviction. The reference standards are
to be found in Law No. 354 dated 27 July 197540 (the so-called prison sys-
tem, hereinafter the Italian Prison System) and in Law Decree No. 8 dated
15 January 199141.
Specifically, Article 4-bis of L. No. 354 of 1975 identifies, in general
terms, certain crimes that prevent people from enjoying the benefits pro-
vided for by the law. The original text of the standard has been amended sev-
eral times over the years and most recently (in the field of terrorism) by Law
Decree No. 7 dated 18 February 201542 and (with reference, however, to
crimes against the public administration and the protection of victims of
gender-based violence respectively) by Law No. 3 dated 9 January 201943 and
by Law No. 69 dated 19 July 201944.
Firstly, it must be noted that, as regards those convicted of one of the
crimes referred to in Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System (which in-
cludes terrorist offences) does not operate, pursuant to the provisions of Ar-
ticle 656, paragraph 9, section a) of the Italian Criminal Code, the mecha-
nism of suspension of enforcement. As a general rule, the latter rule makes
it possible to suspend the enforcement of the detention order for short
prison sentences pending a decision on the applicability of any alternative
measures to detention. However, the seriousness of terrorist offences justi-
fies, from the legislator’s point of view, the immediate imprisonment of the
for the collaborator detained or subjected to special protection measures to be guaranteed
the absence of contact with other persons who have made the same procedural choice, pre-
cisely in order to avoid any form of conditioning or breach. The sanction due to failure to
comply with these precautions shall be that the statements made after the date on which the
breach occurred cannot be used in court. R.A. RUGGIERO, L’attendibilità delle dichiarazioni dei
collaboratori di giustizia nella chiamata in correità (Giappichelli 2012) 173.
39 Ibid., 172.
40 Law No. 354 of 26 July 1975, ‘Norme sull’ordinamento penitenziario e sull’esecuzione
delle misure privative e limitative della libertà’.
41 Decree Law No. 8 of 15 January 1991, ’Nuove norme in materia di sequestri di per-
sona a scopo di estorsione e per la protezione dei testimoni di giustizia, nonché per la protezione
e il trattamento sanzionatorio di coloro che collaborano con la giustizia’, converted, with
amendments, by Law No. 82 of 15 March 1991.
42 Decree Law No. 7 of 18 February 2015, ‘Misure urgenti per il contrasto del terror-
ismo, anche di matrice internazionale, nonché proroga delle missioni internazionali delle
Forze armate e di polizia, iniziative di cooperazione allo sviluppo e sostegno ai processi di ri-
costruzione e partecipazione alle iniziative delle Organizzazioni internazionali per il consol-
idamento dei processi di pace e di stabilizzazione’, converted, with amendments, by Law No.
43 of 17 April 2015.
43 Law No. 3 of 9 January 2019, ‘Misure per il contrasto dei reati contro la pubblica am-
ministrazione, nonché in materia di prescrizione del reato e in materia di trasparenza dei partiti
e movimenti politici’.
44 Law No. 69 of 19 July 2019, ‘Modifiche al codice penale, al codice di procedura penale
e altre disposizioni in materia di tutela delle vittime di violenza domestica e di genere’.
42 SECTION I – CHAPTER 1
convicted person regardless of the future applicability of an alternative mea-
sure to imprisonment.
With reference to the scope of application of the provision in question,
although Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System is unequivocally aimed at
regulating access to prison benefits, case law has stated that the discipline is
to be considered applicable – where possible – also to persons in custody45.
Such an extension of application is, however, to be criticised given the ex-
ceptional nature of this forecast.
The first paragraph of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System sets out
that detainees and prisoners who have been detained for crimes committed
for the purposes of terrorism, including international terrorism, or subver-
sion through the commission of acts of violence can access the benefits pro-
vided for therein and alternative measures to detention, except for early re-
lease, only if they cooperate with the legal process in accordance with Arti-
cle 58-ter of the Italian Prison System Specifically, the prison benefits
subject to the requirements examined are the assignment to outside work
pursuant to Article 21 of the Italian Prison System, the reward permits pur-
suant to Article 30-ter of the Italian Prison System46 and the alternative mea-
sures to detention provided for in Chapter VI (excluding early release), i.e.,
probation with the social service pursuant to Article 47 of the Italian Prison
System, the various forms of home detention pursuant to Article 47-ter of
the Italian Prison System and semi-freedom pursuant to Article 50 of the
Italian Prison System. Access to parole for persons convicted of the crimes
referred to in Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System is also subject to the
existence of the requirements provided for therein in accordance with the
provisions of Article 2, paragraph 1 of Law Decree No. 152 dated 13.5.1991.
Paragraph 1-bis of Article 4-bis specifies, however, that the above bene-
fits may also be granted in cases where:
a) collaboration is “impossible” due to limited participation in the crim-
inal act, ascertained in the conviction or, in any case, in light of the ascer-
tainment of the facts and responsibilities established by irrevocable judge-
ment;
45 Court of Cassation, judgment of 23 April 2004, Virga, in C.e.d. No. 230807; Id., 14
March 03, Ganci, in C.e.d. No. 226629; Id., 27 November 1996, Piarulli, in C.e.d., 206447.
46 On the subject of reward permits, the Constitutional Court recently issued a ruling
with sentence No. 253/2019 in relation to life imprisonment for mafia offences. A question
had been raised as to the constitutional legitimacy of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison Sys-
tem insofar as it prevents the crimes specified therein from being allowed to reward convicts
who do not cooperate with the legal process.
The Constitutional Court has declared the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 4-bis,
paragraph 1, of the Italian Prison System in the part in which it does not provide for the
granting of reward permits in the absence of collaboration with the legal process, even if el-
ements have been acquired such as to rule out both the topicality of participation in the
criminal association and, more generally, the danger of re-establishing links with organised
crime.
The presumption of “social dangerousness” of the non-cooperative prisoner with refer-
ence to the granting of reward permits is no longer to be considered absolute, but relative.
This “may be passed by the supervising magistrate, whose assessment on a case-by-case ba-
sis must be based on prison reports and information and opinions from various authorities,
from the Anti-Mafia or Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office to the competent Provincial Com-
mittee for Public Order and Security”.
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b) the cooperation offered is “objectively irrelevant”, but one of the mit-
igating circumstances provided for in Article 62 No. 6 (compensation for
damages) has been applied to said detainees or prisoners, even if the com-
pensation for damages was paid after the conviction, in Article 114 (minor
criminal participation) or in Article 116, paragraph 2 (event more serious
than that intended) of the Italian Criminal Code.
However, no benefit can be granted to detainees and prisoners for ma-
licious crimes “when the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor or the District
Prosecutor communicates, on his own initiative or on the recommendation
of the Provincial Committee for Public Order and Security competent in re-
lation to the place of detention or imprisonment, the topicality of connec-
tions with organised crime” (Article 4-bis paragraph 3-bis of the Italian
Prison System).
Again, it is not difficult to grasp the rationale of the forecasts under
consideration. Given the seriousness of the crimes listed in Article 4-bis of
the Italian Prison System, the Legislator intends to avoid the application of
favourable treatment during the enforcement of the sentence in the absence
of indices of penitents by the offender, amongst which there is also conduct
of collaboration indicative of the discontinuation of the ties with the crimi-
nal environment. Essentially, there is an absolute presumption of social dan-
gerousness for those convicted of terrorist crimes, a presumption that can
only be overcome if such persons decide to cooperate pursuant to Article 58-
ter of the Italian Prison System.
A central element in the governance referred to in Article 4-bis of the
Italian Prison System is therefore that of the collaboration described in Arti-
cle 58-ter of the Italian Prison System. It takes the form of the conduct of
“those who, even after conviction, have taken steps to prevent the criminal
activity from leading to further consequences or who have specifically
helped the police or judicial authorities in the collection of decisive elements
for the reconstruction of the events and for the identification or capture of
the perpetrators of the crimes” and whose assessment is up to them, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of the Article 58-ter of
the Italian Prison System to the “supervisory court, having obtained the nec-
essary information and consulted the public prosecutor with the court com-
petent for the crimes for which cooperation has been provided”.
As mentioned above, the hard-preclusive logic of the double track is
partially rebalanced by the provisions of paragraph 1-bis of Article 4-bis of
the Italian Prison System, which governs cases of so-called irrelevant collab-
oration and the so-called impossible or unreasonable collaboration. In both
of these situations, in fact, the final effect is that of breaking down the bar-
rier to access to benefits.
As regards irrelevant cooperation, it would be unfair to prevent the ap-
plication of prison benefits to a person who is unable to report useful ele-
ments only due to the fact that he himself lacks such knowledge. Prerequi-
sites for the application of the governance as regards irrelevant collaboration
are as follows: 1) the acquisition of elements such as to suggest that there is
no connection with terrorist crime (see below); 2) the recognition – in the
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sentence of conviction – of one of the mitigating circumstances referred to
in Articles 62, No. 6), 114 or 116, paragraph 2 of the Italian Criminal Code.
The criterion that distinguishes so-called irrelevant collaboration from
collaboration pursuant to Article 58-ter of the Italian Prison System is a
purely quantitative criterion. In this context, there are no elements of a sub-
jective nature such as the reasons that led the condemned person to collab-
orate, the spontaneity of the collaboration or the possible penitents. Collab-
oration must in any case be full and the willingness to cooperate must be as-
certained in practice. In any case, deliberately limited or partial cooperation
are not permitted.
The other case considered by paragraph 1-bis of Article 4-bis of the Ital-
ian Prison System is that of so-called impossible collaboration. On this
point, the contribution made by the case law of the Constitutional Court,
which extended the concept of irrelevant collaboration – already present in
the formulation of the rule under the terms described above – to all those
cases in which the convicted person finds himself in the objective impossi-
bility of collaborating is essential. This can happen for two reasons: a) the
convicted person had such a marginal role that he could not have known
anything useful for the judicial authorities47 or b) because the conviction
had already fully established the facts and responsibilities48. Also in this
case, it would clearly be unfair to exclude the applicability of prison benefits
to a convicted person who is unable to make a useful contribution to the ju-
dicial authorities for reasons beyond his control, such as limited participa-
tion in the facts of the crime, the secondary role he plays, or in cases in
which the judgement on the merits of the case has proved suitable to clarify
every aspect both in terms of ascertaining the facts and in terms of the per-
sons to whom they should be attributed.
Currently, when the path of collaboration is completely impracticable,
in order to remove the foreclosures, set forth in Article 4-bis of the Italian
Prison System, the existence of elements suitable to exclude connections be-
tween the condemned person and terrorist activity must be considered suffi-
cient.
With reference to the marginality of the role played by the convicted
person, the supervisory court will have to ascertain its existence on the basis
of what has been ascertained with the conviction, with any difference as-
sessment being foreclosed, due to the intangibility of the judged person. It
must clearly emerge from the sentence of conviction that, regardless of the
acknowledgement of the mitigating circumstance of Article 114 of the Italian
Criminal Code, the convicted person has played a marginal and negligible
role in relation to the criminal act and that this has foreclosed him from
having access to information expendable for collaborative purposes49. To
this end, the grounds for the judgement applying the penalty at the request
of the parties50.
47 Constitutional Court No. 357 of 1994.
48 Constitutional Court No. 68 of 1995.
49 Court of Cassation, judgment of 15 May 1995, Enea (1996) 2 GP 250.
50 Court of Cassation, judgment of 12 July 1995 (1996) RP 518.
45ITALY
The Constitutional Court51 specified that, in any event, the assessment
as to impossible cooperation could not be based on the condemned person’s
protest of innocence which, it stated, could not be relevant at the enforce-
ment stage to the outcome of a final judgement.
The moment to which reference must be made as regards the ascer-
tainment of the impossibility and unreasonableness of collaboration coin-
cides, according to case law, with the moment in which the application for
access to benefits is submitted. In this way, the silence kept by the defendant
during his proceedings should not adversely affect the assessment made by
the supervisory court.
According to the prevailing case law, it is for the defendant to attach to
the application for access to the benefit the documentation capable of prov-
ing the circumstances, objective and subjective, which make it impossible to
cooperate usefully, circumstances which will then be ascertained by the
competent court. However, it should be noted that the court is not foreclosed
from making an ex officio finding of its own motion as to the existence of
further elements capable of establishing a finding of impossibility of coop-
eration.
The order by which the supervisory court rejects the sentenced person’s
request must in any event be reasoned52.
A recent ruling of the Supreme Court of Cassation has intervened on
the subject of collaboration pursuant to paragraph 1-ter of Article 4-bis of
the Italian Prison System stating that, for the purposes of granting the
prison benefits referred to therein, the doubt as to the existence of the pre-
supposition of the impossibility or irrelevance of the collaboration of the
person concerned with the judiciary due to the limited participation in the
fact or the complete ascertainment of the facts and responsibilities, condi-
tions equated by the regulatory provision to the requirement of collabora-
tion with the judiciary which must necessarily concur with that of the lack
of current links with organised crime, cannot be to the detriment of the ap-
plicant, given that the rule of judgement according to which, if two mean-
ings can equally be attributed to a given evidence, the one most favourable
to the person concerned must be preferred, which can be set aside only
where it is irreconcilable with other unambiguous elements of the opposite
sign. The maximum constitutes shareable projection of the scope of the rule
of in dubio pro reo operating with knowledge of the facts.
In any case – as anticipated – in both situations (irrelevant collabora-
tion and impossible collaboration), there must be elements such as to ex-
clude the actuality of connections with terrorist criminality and, therefore,
sufficient to corroborate the case of an effective detachment from the crim-
inal organisation.
The problems in relation to such an assessment arise, in the first place,
with reference to all those cases in which the commission of the crime does
not depend on the existence of an organised criminal structure since what is
51 Constitutional Court No. 306 of 1993.
52 Court of Cassation, judgment of 9 June 1998, Di Quarto (1999) CP 2284.
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required to prove is, essentially, the dissolution of an associative bond which
has never existed. With specific reference to the terrorism phenomenon, it
suffices to consider, for example, how the conviction for a crime with the
purpose of terrorism committed by means of violence against the person,
which in itself is an obstacle to the granting of the benefits, could well dis-
regard the protest of an associative crime53.
If it is not possible to ascertain the detachment from the criminal or-
ganisation, nor if, however, there are any indications of continuing member-
ship of the bond, the only solution consistent with the Italian trial system
seems to be that of in dubio pro reo: if two meanings can equally be attrib-
uted to a given evidence, the one most favourable to the person concerned
must be given priority, which can be set aside only where it is irreconcilable
with other unambiguous elements of the opposite sign.
In line with this conclusion, the most recent case law of the Court of
Cassation seems to be in line with this conclusion, which states that the ex-
istence of elements that exclude the topicality of links with crime constitutes
a condition that is concurrent but independent from that of the so-called im-
possible or irrelevant collaboration54. Given that this is an independent as-
sessment, all the rules laid down in the Code concerning the investigating
and assessing powers of the supervisory judiciary will have to be applied, in-
cluding precisely that which prevents decisions unfavourable to the con-
victed person in the absence of positive evidence of the circumstances justi-
fying them.
As regards the procedure, Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System im-
poses on the supervisory magistrate the obligation to decide on the granting
of the benefit requested after obtaining detailed information through the
provincial committee for public order and safety (so-called “Comitato
provinciale per l’ordine e la sicurezza pubblica”, “Provincial Committee for
Public Order and Security”, hereinafter C.P.O.S.), which is competent in re-
lation to the convicted person’s place of detention.
The C.P.O.S. was established under Law No. 121 of 1981, with the aim
of improving police coordination. These are bodies with consultative func-
tions, set up at each Prefecture. They are presided over by the Prefect and
are composed, by law, of the Chief of Police, the Mayor of the municipality
of the capital and the President of the province, the Provincial Commanders
of the Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza (Italian Finance Police), as
well as by the exponents of the public administrations, of the judiciary, of
the structures of public security, which the Prefect may invite to participate
(Article 20 Law No. 212 of 1981).
The choice to include a typically preventive body that is dependent on
the executive body (specifically, the Ministry of the Interior) in a delicate
phase such as that of enforcement, has raised several perplexities in doc-
trine55. The composition and the (public security) functions attributed to
53 See, also for further references, L. CARACENI, ‘sub Art. 4-bis’, in F. DALLA CASA, G. GIOS-
TRA, Ordinamento penitenziario commentato (Cedam 2019) 73-76.
54 Court of Cassation, judgment of 7 April 2017, Cataldo, in C.e.d. n. 270864.
55 Ibid., 80-83.
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these bodies, in fact, condition the impartiality that should characterise a ju-
dicial procedure, given that the C.P.O.S. is able to form, through indepen-
dently acquired sources, a large part of the cognitive platform on which the
court will rely for the decision.
In any event, it should be noted that, although the request for informa-
tion is a due act by the supervisory judiciary, such information is not bind-
ing on the decision. On the contrary, the court is in any case obliged to de-
cide after thirty days from the request (this term can be extended by a fur-
ther thirty days if the C.P.O.S. communicates that there are “specific security
needs or that connections could be maintained with organisations operating
in non-local or non-national areas”).
Lastly, the governance described so far does not apply, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 3-bis of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison
System, in the event that the National or District Anti-Mafia Prosecutor
(and, as of, 2015, also Anti-Terrorism) should communicate, on his own ini-
tiative or upon notification of the provincial committee for public order and
security competent in relation to the place of detention or internment, the
topicality of connections with the organised crime of the offender.
The rule, which is much criticised by the doctrine, ends up attributing
a real power of veto to an investigative body, capable of preventing access to
benefits for those convicted of terrorist crimes56. On this point, case law has
attempted to trace these communications back to the same parameters elab-
orated for the information of the C.P.S.O. and, therefore, has affirmed that
the opinion of the Public Prosecutor cannot be considered binding and that
the court, which must decide on the possibility of access to the benefit is in
any case under an obligation to verify the validity of the information trans-
mitted by the Public Prosecutor, since it cannot be uncritically accepted57.
Turning to the special governance dictated in matters of terrorism by
Article 16-nonies of Law Decree No. 8 of 1991 – as last amended by Law De-
cree No. 7 of 2015 – it is established in paragraph 1 that as regards the con-
victed persons who have provided, also after the conviction, some of the con-
duct of collaboration which allows the granting of the mitigating circum-
stances provided for by the Criminal Code or by special provisions, the
parole, the granting of the reward permits and the admission to the measure
of home detention provided for by Article 47-ter of Law No. 354 dated 26
July 1975, and subsequent amendments, are ordered upon proposal or after
hearing the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor.
Given the characteristics and the social alarm caused by terrorist of-
fences, it is therefore intended to make the granting of certain measures sub-
ject to a further opinion by the authority specifically responsible for the re-
pression of the phenomenon.
The proposal or the opinion of the national prosecutor must contain
the assessment of the convicted person’s conduct and social dangerousness,
taking into account the conduct of the convicted person in the course of the
56 Ibid., 85-87.
57 Court of cassation, judgment of 15 March 1994, Meles, (1995) CP 3069; Court of cas-
sation, judgment of 11 January 1994, Bellavia, (1995) CP 703.
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criminal proceedings (specifically, it is required to specify whether the con-
victed person has ever refused to submit to questioning or examination or
other act of investigation in the course of the criminal proceedings for which
he has cooperated), as well as any element considered relevant “for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the convicted person’s penitents, also with reference to
the relevance of the links with organised or subversive crime” (paragraph 3).
As regards the requirement of penitents, the case law has specified that
the existence of penitents cannot be inferred from the mere fact of collabo-
ration.
The sentenced person, in accordance with the second paragraph, must
provide the judicial authority competent to decide on the granting of the
benefit with any useful information on the characteristics of the collabora-
tion provided, attaching to the proposal or opinion, if requested by the court
or the supervisory magistrate, a copy of the report explaining the contents of
the collaboration and, if he is a person subject to protection measures, the
relevant implementing measure.
The competent court, once it has obtained the proposal or the opinion
of the national prosecutor, will have to decide on the grant of the benefit
having regard to the importance of cooperation and provided that there is
penitents and no evidence to suggest links with organised or subversive
crime. The granting measure may be adopted by the court or by the super-
visory magistrate also in derogation of the provisions in force, including
those relating to the penalty limits set out in Article 176 of the Italian Crim-
inal Code and Articles 30-ter and 47-ter of Law No. 354 dated 26 July 1975
and subsequent amendments. The measure – specifies paragraph 4 of Article
16-nonies – must be “specifically reasoned” if the national prosecutor has ex-
pressed an unfavourable opinion.
If the convicted person decides to cooperate as regards facts other than
those for which the conviction was given, the fifth paragraph specifies that
the benefits referred to above may be “granted by way of derogation from
the provisions in force only after the judgement at first instance concerning
the facts which are the subject of the cooperation”. Case law has intervened
to clarify the scope of this provision, which differs from the cases referred to
in the preceding paragraphs in relation to the subject matter of the cooper-
ation. In the case referred to in the fifth paragraph, the convicted person
makes statements only with reference to facts other than those for which he
has been convicted and, therefore, the collaboration has, as its object, state-
ments exclusively incriminating third parties; in other cases, on the other
hand, the convicted person makes statements concerning the facts for which
he has been convicted, as well as, possibly, statements on the fact of others.
In the presence of statements exclusively incriminating third parties, there-
fore, the granting of benefits is subject to the issue of a sentence – even if not
final – that confirms that what has been declared by the convicted person
during the collaboration meets the requirements of Article 9, paragraph 3 of
Law Decree No. 8 of 1991, i.e., the intrinsic reliability and considerable im-
portance of it in terms of novelty, completeness or other elements, as regards
the structural connotations, equipment of weapons, explosives or goods, ar-
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ticulations and internal or international connections of mafia-type or terror-
ist-subversive criminal organisations, or as regards the objectives, aims and
operating methods of the same organisations. Also in this case, the
favourable treatment is therefore subordinate to the effectiveness and im-
portance of the collaboration offered.
From a different point of view, the characteristics of the cooperation
may also be relevant for the withdrawal or replacement of any precautionary
measures applied to the declarant. Article 16-octies of Decree-Law No. 8 of
1991 provides, however, that the amendment in melius cannot constitute an
automatic consequence of the collaborative conduct. The measure of pre-
trial detention may also be revoked or replaced only in the event that, in the
context of the investigations carried out as regards the existence of pre-trial
detention, the proceeding court has not acquired elements from which it is
possible to deduce the topicality of the links with terrorist crime. To this
end, it will in any case be necessary to hear the National Anti-Mafia and
Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor, as well as the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutors at
the relevant courts of appeal and to verify that the collaborator, where sub-
ject to protection measures, has complied with the commitments made un-
der Article 12.
2.7. Conditions for the use of the declarations obtained (probative value of de-
clarations)
The question arises as to how statements made by those who decide to
cooperate can be brought in and used in other criminal proceedings.
The reference legislation is dictated by Legislative Decree No. 8 of
199158 as amended by Law No. 45 of 200159 and, specifically, by the provi-
sions contained in Chapter II-ter, concerning the sanctioning treatment of
those who cooperate with the justice system.
Article 16-quater of Legislative Decree No. 8 of 1991 establishes, firstly,
that whoever intends to cooperate with the judiciary for the purpose of
granting special protection measures, recognition of mitigating circum-
stances or access to prison benefits must make his or her statements to the
Public Prosecutor’s Office within one hundred and eighty days of the afore-
mentioned manifestation of will.
The deadline of one hundred and eighty days is important in two re-
spects: firstly, failure to comply with the deadline makes it impossible to
grant the protective measures provided for informants by the same Legisla-
tive Decree No. 8 of 1991 (if they have been granted, they must be revoked).
Furthermore, declarations made outside that period may not be currencies
58 Decree Law No. 8 of 15 January 1991, ‘Nuove norme in materia di sequestri di per-
sona a scopo di estorsione e per la protezione dei testimoni di giustizia, nonché per la protezione
e il trattamento sanzionatorio di coloro che collaborano con la giustizia’, converted, with
amendments, by Law No. 82 of 15 March 1991.
59 Law No. 45 of 13 February 2001, ‘Modifica della disciplina della protezione e del trat-
tamento sanzionatorio di coloro che collaborano con la giustizia nonché disposizioni a favore
delle persone che prestano testimonianza’.
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for the purposes of proving the facts stated in them against persons other
than the declarant, unless they are unrepeatable (see below). This is in-
tended to oblige the registrant to immediately share all information in his
possession, avoiding reticent, partial and, therefore, unreliable stories.
The content of the statements made must be transcribed – in accor-
dance with the procedures set out in Article 141-bis of the Italian Criminal
Code – in the so-called minutes explaining the contents of the statement.
The descriptive minutes are included in their entirety in a special file
held by the Public Prosecutor who received the statements. In addition, an
extract from the minutes is included in the file provided for by Article 416,
paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., in the file sent to the
court at the preliminary hearing, relating to the proceedings “to which the
statements respectively and directly refer”.
The minutes are covered by secrecy as long as the acts contained in the
file of the Public Prosecutor responsible for the proceedings to which the
statements refer are secret and, in any case, their publication is prohibited
pursuant to Article 114 of the Italian Criminal Code. The provision is clearly
intended to protect the functionality of the investigations and also to protect
the registrant himself.
As to the content of the minutes, the convicted person must declare to
the Public Prosecutor, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 16-
quater, all the information in his possession useful for the reconstruction of
the facts and circumstances on which he is interrogated, as well as the other
facts of greater gravity and social alarm of which he is aware, in addition to
the identification and capture of their authors and also the information nec-
essary so that it may proceed to the identification, seizure and confiscation
of the money, goods and any other usefulness of which it itself or, with ref-
erence to the data available to it, others belonging to the criminal groups di-
rectly or indirectly dispose.
It has already been said that it must be a full cooperation, as partial or
limited cooperation cannot be considered sufficient in certain circum-
stances. In fact, the fourth paragraph of Article 16-quater specifies that the
person who makes the declarations must certify, in the descriptive report,
that he “is not in possession of news and information that can be used in
court on other facts or situations, also not connected or connected to those
reported, of specific seriousness or in any case such as to highlight the social
dangerousness of individuals or criminal groups”. This statement is of par-
ticular importance as regards the granting of protection measures: if the
statement proves to be “untrue”, the protection measures cannot be granted
or, if they have already been applied, must be revoked.
All the statements and information that are included in the descriptive
minutes are those “that can be used in court and which, pursuant to Article
194 of the Italian Criminal Code, may be the subject of testimony”.
The rule specifies – similarly to what is generally provided for by the
Code of Criminal Procedure – that the statements in the descriptive minutes
cannot be the subject of testimony if the convicted person has “inferred from
current rumours or similar situations”. Similar to what is generally pre-
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scribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, such information could not be
adequately verified in contradictory manner, thus lacking a minimum relia-
bility coefficient.
In addition, they may not be used in proceedings to which statements
made after the 180-day period referred to above relate. This is a subjectively
relative physiological unusability, which needs to be addressed.
Firstly, with reference to the dies a quo of the term in question, the case
law of the Court of Cassation has intervened by specifying that “for the pur-
poses of the usability of the declarations made by the so called “informants”,
the moment from which the term of one hundred and eighty days starts to
run within which the person who has expressed the willingness to cooperate
must make known to the Public Prosecutor all the information in his pos-
session, coincides with the drafting of the minutes describing the contents of
the cooperation and not with that when such will was only generically ex-
pressed” (C 25.3.2011, No. 14556).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court specified that the unusability of the
statements made by “informants”, beyond the term of one hundred and
eighty days from the beginning of the collaboration, does not fall within the
categories of “pathological unusability”, from which the evidentiary acts
taken “contra legem” are affected and cannot, therefore, be deduced nor de-
tected in the abridged judgement. This conclusion is currently confirmed by
the text of Article 438, paragraph 6-bis, of the Italian Criminal Code, as
amended by Law 103 of 2017. In fact, according to the rules currently in
force, the request for an abbreviated judgement entails the non-detectability
of the unusability other than that resulting from the breach of an evidentiary
prohibition.
The statements made by the collaborator outside of the term referred to
in paragraph 1 of Article 16-quater, therefore, can be used in the preliminary
investigation phase, specifically for the purpose of issuing the personal and
real precautionary measures, as well as in the preliminary hearing and in the
abbreviated trial60.
As regards the tangible modalities of acquisition of what has been de-
clared by the collaborator, the governance is dictated by Article 16-sexies of
Law Decree No. 8 of 1991, the content of which must necessarily be coordi-
nated with the governance of the code of ritual.
The aforementioned statement states that, when the collaborator is to
be interrogated or examined as a witness or accused person in a related pro-
ceeding or of an offence connected with the case provided for in Article 371,
paragraph 2, section b) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, the court,
at the request of the party, shall order that the minutes illustrating the con-
tents of the cooperation referred to in Article 16-quater be obtained from the
Public Prosecutor’s Office’s file, limited to those parts of it which concern the
liability of the accused in the proceedings.
Due to the specific qualification held, some special rules are dictated
for the assessment of the statements made by the collaborator. He could in
60 Court of Cassation, judgment of 25 September 2008. Magistris, in C.e.d. No. 241882.
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fact be led to report untrue circumstances for the sole purpose of profiting
from the benefits of the cooperation and is, therefore, subject to a relative
presumption of unreliability.
In general terms, Article 192, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Italian Crimi-
nal Code establishes that statements made by any defendant for the same of-
fence for which proceedings are being carried out or for related or con-
nected offences are assessed together with other evidence confirming their
reliability. The provision, evidently applicable also to the collaborator who is
also accused, therefore introduces a special rule of assessment that prevents
the statements coming from the perpetrator from being considered in the
absence of further and autonomous elements capable of confirming their
genuineness.
The case law has further reaffirmed the need for an in-depth delibera-
tion of the personal reliability of the collaborators, consisting of a preventive,
general and unfailing examination, without which the subsequent ones of in-
trinsic credibility of internal coherence and logic and the search for external
feedback appear incomplete and not self-sufficient as well as secondary.
The court must therefore firstly assess the reliability of the collaborator
in relation to his personality, his social-family conditions, his delinquent
past, his relationships with the accused of complicity and the remote and
imminent genesis of his resolution to the confession or accusation of the co-
perpetrators or accomplices. Only in a second step will the intrinsic coher-
ence of what is referred to have to be verified in the light of the criteria of
precision, coherence, constancy, spontaneity. Lastly, the statements made
must be considered in relation to external elements capable of confirming
their genuineness.
2.8. Measures for the protection of the repentant
The Italian law provides an articulated system of protection for the so-
called informants. The reference framework is contained in Chapter II of De-
cree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The system is divided into three levels, due to the increasing danger for
the safety of the collaborator. The existing measures are in as follows:
1) ordinary protection measures, which are taken by the public security
authority or, in the case of detained or imprisoned persons, by the prison ad-
ministration;
2) the provisional protection plan referred to in Article 13, paragraph 1
of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991;
3) the special protection measures referred to in Article 13, paragraph
4 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991;
4) the special protection programme referred to in Article 13, para-
graph 5 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The instruments of protection referred to in points 2), 3) and 4) are the
responsibility of the Commission under Article 10 of Decree Law No. 8 of
1991.
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The bodies involved in the procedure for applying, amending or with-
drawing the special protection measures and the special protection pro-
gramme are the Commission referred to in Article 10 and the Central Pro-
tection Service referred to in Article 14 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice also play an im-
portant role. Specifically, with reference to the time before the enforcement
of the measures, it is up to them to appoint the Commission referred to
above.
For the application of special protection measures, cooperation or
statements made in the course of criminal proceedings are relevant. They
must have the character of “intrinsic reliability”, as well as of “novelty”,
“completeness” and, in any case, must “appear of considerable importance
for the development of the investigations or for the purposes of the judge-
ment or for the activities of investigation on the structural connotations, the
endowment of arms, explosives or goods, the articulations and the internal
or international connections of the criminal organisations of mafia or ter-
rorist-subversive type or on the objectives, purposes and operative modali-
ties of said organisations”.
In any case, these measures can only be applied if “the inadequacy of
the ordinary protection measures adopted by the public security authorities
or, in the case of persons detained or interned, by the Ministry of Justice –
Department of Prison Administration” is apparent. In addition, it must ap-
pear that these persons are in serious and current danger due to the collab-
orative conduct described above in relation to certain crimes, including
those committed for the purposes of terrorism.
The protection measures must be appropriate to ensure the safety of
the recipients, including, where necessary, their assistance.
Article 9 paragraph 4 specifies that in the event that the special protec-
tion measures are not appropriate to the seriousness and topicality of the
danger, they may also be “applied through the definition of a special protec-
tion programme”. Paragraph 5 specifies that the measures identified in this
way may also be applied to those who live permanently with those who de-
cide to collaborate, as well as, in the presence of specific situations, also to
those who are exposed to serious, current and tangible danger due to rela-
tions with the same persons. With reference to the latter category of persons,
the need to apply the protection measure will have to be assessed from time
to time in relation to the specific needs of the case: the rule, in fact, specifies
that the relationship of kinship, affinity or marriage alone, does not deter-
mine, in the absence of stable cohabitation, the application of the measures.
With reference to the assessment as regards the situations of danger,
paragraph 6 establishes that “in addition to the depth of the conduct of col-
laboration or the relevance and quality of the declarations made, also the re-
action characteristics of the criminal group in relation to which the collabo-
ration or declarations are made are taken into account, assessed with specific
reference to the intimidating force which the group is locally able to use”.
As regards the procedure for the application of those measures, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article 11 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991, the
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proposal for admission to the special protection measures is, as a rule, made
by the public prosecutor whose office proceeds or has proceeded with the
facts set out in the statements made by the collaborator who is assumed to
be in serious and current danger. If the District Anti-Mafia Directorate is
proceeding or has proceeded and a district attorney has not been appointed
to the latter, but rather a representative of the district attorney has been ap-
pointed, the proposal is made by the latter.
In the event that the statements made relate to proceedings for crimes
committed for the purposes of terrorism in relation to which it appears that
several offices of the Public Prosecutor proceed with investigations con-
nected pursuant to Article 371 of the Italian Criminal Code, the proposal is
formulated by one of the proceeding offices in agreement with the others
and communicated to the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecu-
tor, who is also competent to decide on any disputes between prosecutors.
The Chief of Police also has the power to make proposals, in agreement
with the other legitimate authorities or after obtaining their opinion.
As regards the content of the proposal, information and elements use-
ful for assessing the seriousness and topicality of the danger to which the
persons concerned may be exposed as a result of the choice to cooperate
with justice, the characteristics of the contribution made and any protective
measures already taken, together with the reasons why they are not consid-
ered adequate, must be specified.
On receipt of the proposal, the Commission will have to decide whether
or not to apply the security measures. In carrying out this task, the Com-
mission has extensive investigative powers: pursuant to the provisions of Ar-
ticle 13, the Commission may acquire specific and detailed information on
the prevention or protection measures already adopted or to be adopted by
the public security authority, the Prison Administration or other bodies, as
well as any other element that may be necessary to define the seriousness
and topicality of the danger in relation to the characteristics of the conduct
of collaboration. It is also provided that, in order to assess the existence of
the conditions for the application of the measures, the Commission may also
proceed to the hearing of the authorities that formulated the proposal or
opinion and of other judicial, investigative and security bodies, being able to
use for the purposes of its decision also acts covered by secrecy pursuant to
Article 329 of the Italian Criminal Code and obtained by the Minister of the
Interior pursuant to the provisions of Article 118 of the Italian Criminal
Code.
When signing the special protection measures granted, the collaborator
is required to provide all the documentation indicated in paragraph 1 of Ar-
ticle 12 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 (relating to the living conditions of him-
self and his family, marital status, family status, pending criminal, civil and
administrative proceedings, educational qualifications, etc.), to elect domi-
cile in the place where the Commission has its headquarters, as well as to
personally undertake a series of commitments. This is a step of fundamental
importance, given that the breach of the same involves the activation of the
mechanisms for replacing and revoking protective measures. Specifically,
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the collaborator personally undertakes to: a) comply with the required safety
standards and actively cooperate in the enforcement of the measures; b) un-
dergo interrogation, examination or other investigative measures, including
the drawing up of a report explaining the contents of the cooperation;
c) comply with the obligations set out by law and the obligations contracted;
d) not to make statements to persons other than the judicial authorities, the
police and their defence counsel concerning facts of interest for the pro-
ceedings in relation to which they have cooperated or are cooperating and
not to meet or contact, by any means or through any means, any person in-
volved in the crime or, except with the authorisation of the judicial authori-
ties when there are serious needs inherent in family life, any person cooper-
ating with the justice system; e) to specify in detail all property owned or
controlled, directly or through a third party, and other benefits available to
them directly or indirectly, and, immediately after admission to the special
protection measures, to pay the money resulting from illegal activities. The
judicial authority shall ensure the immediate seizure of the aforementioned
money and assets and utilities.
Article 13 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 sets out the manner in which
the Commission decides on the granting of protection measures and defines,
in part, the content of the special protection measures which may be
adopted, with reference to the implementing decree for detailed rules.
It should be noted, firstly, that provision is made for provisional mea-
sures to be taken in cases of urgency. Paragraph 1 empowers the Commis-
sion to decide on the application of a provisional protection plan in cases of
urgency and where there is a request from the proposing authority on the
matter. The decision can also be taken without formalities and, in any case,
within the first session following the request, if necessary, information from
the Central Protection Service as per Article 14 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991.
The request for application of the provisional measure must contain: 1)
the information and elements useful for assessing of the seriousness and
topicality of the danger to which the persons concerned are or may be ex-
posed as a result of the choice to cooperate with justice made by the person
who made the declarations; 2) any protective measures adopted or made to
be adopted and the reasons why they do not appear adequate; 3) at least a
brief indication of the facts on which the person concerned has expressed
the willingness to cooperate and the reasons why the cooperation is consid-
ered reliable and of considerable importance; 4) the circumstances from
which the specific seriousness of the danger and the urgency of providing it
result.
The measure by which the Commission applies the provisional protec-
tion plan ceases to be effective if, after one hundred and eighty days (which
may be extended by the President of the Commission), the authority em-
powered to formulate the proposal for admission under Article 11 of Decree
Law No. 8 of 1991 has not forwarded it and the Commission has not decided
on the application of the special protection measures in accordance with the
ordinary forms and procedures of the procedure.
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During the ordinary procedure, it must generally be observed that the
Commission referred to in Article 10 decides on the proposal for admission
to the special protection measures by a majority of its members and pro-
vided that at least five of them are present at the meeting. The rule gives
precedence, in the event of a tie, to the vote of the President. The intention
to give more weight to the positions of the executive appears evident, the
President being an Undersecretary of State for the Interior.
In order to decide on the application of the special protection mea-
sures, the Commission has a broad investigative power, being entitled to ob-
tain information both from the relevant administrative bodies and from the
authorities entitled to submit the proposal.
With specific reference to the content of the special protection mea-
sures and the provisional plan, this is determined by a ministerial decree61.
It can be represented by the preparation of protection measures to be car-
ried out by the competent territorial police bodies, the preparation of tech-
nical security measures, the adoption of the necessary measures for trans-
fers to municipalities other than those of residence, the provision of contin-
gent interventions aimed at facilitating social reintegration as well as the
use, in compliance with the rules of the prison system, of special methods of
custody in institutions or the enforcement of translations and planting.
If these measures do not prove sufficient to ensure the protection of the
collaborator, a special programme may be adopted by the Commission. This
will have to be elaborated and modulated from time to time in relation to
the needs and situations concretely proposed and may include, in addition
to the protection measures mentioned above, also the “transfer of persons
not detained in protected places, special methods of keeping documentation
and communications to the computer service, personal and economic assis-
tance measures, change of personal details, measures to promote the social
reintegration of collaborators and other persons under protection as well as
extraordinary measures that may be necessary”. There is also a specific
framework for economic assistance measures, to be assessed also in relation
to the working capacity of the person under protection, as well as the possi-
bility of using cover documents.
When, on the other hand, detainees or prisoners are in need of protec-
tion, it is up to the Department of Prison Administration to assign them to
institutions or sections of institutions that guarantee the specific security
needs. In the case of detained persons, there is the possibility that forms of
protection may also be applied in view of the formulation of the proposal, at
the request of the Public Prosecutor who has collected or is about to collect
the statements of collaboration or the minutes describing the contents of the
collaboration.
Also in this case, for the definition of the specific methods of protec-
tion, reference should be made to the provisions of the relative implement-
61 Ministerial Decree No. 161 of 23 April 2004, ‘Regolamento ministeriale concernente le
speciali misure di protezione previste per i collaboratori di giustizia e i testimoni, ai sensi del-
l’articolo 17-bis del decreto-legge 15 gennaio 1991, n. 8, convertito, con modificazioni, dalla
legge 15 marzo 1991, n. 82, introdotto dall’articolo 19 della legge 13 febbraio 2001, n. 45’.
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ing decree; in any case, it will be necessary to ensure that the collaborator is
“subjected to prison treatment measures, especially organisational mea-
sures, aimed at preventing him from meeting other people who already ap-
pear to be collaborating with the legal process and aimed at ensuring that
the genuineness of the declarations cannot be compromised”. During the
drafting of the minutes and, in any case, until the drafting of the descriptive
minutes, it is forbidden “to submit the person making the statements to the
investigative interviews referred to in Article 18-bis, paragraphs 1 and 5, of
Law No. 354 dated 26 July 1975 and subsequent amendments”, as well as “to
have correspondence by letter, telegraph or telephone” and “to meet other
persons who collaborate with the legal process, unless authorised by the ju-
dicial authorities for purposes connected with protection needs or when se-
rious needs relating to family life occur”.
Failure to comply with these requirements shall result in the sanction
of unusable statements made to the public prosecutor’s office and the judi-
cial police after the date on which the breach took place unless they are un-
repeatable.
Lastly, it should be noted that the enforcement and specification of the
implementing rules of the special protection programme decided upon by
the Commission is carried out by the Central Protection Service. This
arrangement is established within the Department of Public Security by de-
cree of the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Minister of Econ-
omy and Finance.
2.9. Evaluation and control of the measure
As regards the assessment of the conditions for access to prison bene-
fits under Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System, it has been mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs that the Provincial Committee for Public Order
and Security plays a fundamental role. It is a body with prevention functions
and is dependent on the Ministry of the Interior which is assigned, by Arti-
cle 4-bis of the Italian Prison System, the task of providing the supervisory
judiciary with any elements relating to the existence, or not, of current links
between the convicted person and crime. On this point, case law has, from
the outset, made it clear that the task of assessing the existence of such ele-
ments is, in any case, a matter for the supervisory judiciary, whose powers
of appreciation as regards the granting of benefits cannot be considered lim-
ited by the opinion of the C.P.O.S. Specifically, it was stated that the infor-
mation provided for by Article 4-bis of Law No. 354 of 1975 (the so-called
Italian Prison System) is mandatory but not binding, given that the Supervi-
sory Court can draw aliunde upon useful elements for the purposes of the
judgement it must formulate, with the sole obligation, if it disagrees with the
conclusions of the provincial committee for public order and security, to
provide a suitable, rigorous and detailed explanation62. It is, therefore, an
obligatory but not binding act for the judiciary to decide.
62 Court of cassation, judgment of 20 January 1992, in C.e.d. No. 189278.
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Also as regards the so-called veto power of the National Anti-Mafia
Prosecutor referred to in paragraph 3-bis of Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison
System, the case law of legitimacy has intervened in order to specify that the
communications provided by the latter constitute the premise for the ascer-
tainment of a situation of preclusion to the granting of the benefit: a situa-
tion which, therefore, must be ascertained, in tangible terms, by the Super-
visory Court, with the – autonomous – assessment of the elements on which
the assertion object of the communication is based63.
With reference to the collaborative conduct referred to in Article 58-ter
of the Italian Prison System, suitable to make the foreclosure of access to
the benefits referred to in Article 4-bis of the Italian Prison System fall, the
assessment thereof is entrusted to the Supervisory Court, which decides af-
ter obtaining the necessary information and consulting the Public Prosecu-
tor with the court competent for the crimes for which the collaboration was
provided (Article 58-ter paragraph 2).
As noted above, the Commission, acting under Article 10 of Decree Law
No. 8 of 1991, decides on the granting, amendment and withdrawal of the
protective measures and their content. It is a body with a mixed composi-
tion: it is formed by a Undersecretary of State for the Interior (who takes on,
by law, the duties of President), a Lawyer of the State, two magistrates, five
officials and officers. Article 10 specifies that the members of the Commis-
sion, other than the President and the Lawyer of the State, shall preferably
be chosen from amongst those who have specific experience in the field and
who have knowledge of current trends in organised crime, but who are not
employed in offices carrying out investigations or preliminary investigations
into facts or proceedings relating to organised mafia crime or terrorist-sub-
versive type crime.
Paragraph 2-quinquies of Article 10 establishes that “the protection
against the measures of the Central Commission with which the special pro-
tection measures are applied, modified or revoked, even if of an urgent or
provisional nature in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 1, is governed
by the Code of Administrative Procedure.
2.10. Revocation of rewarding measures
In general, all benefits granted to perpetrators of crimes committed for
terrorist purposes are revocable if they have been granted on the basis of
non-genuine cooperation. This is clearly intended to ensure that someone
can unjustly benefit from the advantages of cooperation.
Firstly, there are mechanisms for reviewing the sentences with which
mitigating circumstances and special causes of non-punishability have been
applied. In view of what has just been said, this is clearly a vastly different
institution from the “traditional” review, which is designed to obtain the re-
vocation of the sentence in the presence of elements likely to lead to the ac-
quittal of the convicted person.
63 Court of cassation, judgment of 3 February 1993.
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More specifically, Article 10 of Law No. 304 of 1982 establishes that
when it turns out that the causes of non-punishability or mitigating circum-
stances provided for by the same law “have been applied as a result of false
or reticent statements, the revision of the sentence is permitted”. Entitled to
the request for review, ex officio or at the request of the Minister of Justice,
are both the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal in the dis-
trict of which the judgement was delivered and the Chief Appeal Court Pros-
ecutor at the Court of Cassation. In this case, there is no limit to the deci-
sion-making powers of the court, which may either impose a more serious
penalty by case or quantity, or withdraw the benefits granted.
The rule specifies, however, that in the event that elements concerning
the falsehood and reticence of the statements should come to light before
the judgement has become final, the documents must be forwarded to the
public prosecutor’s office at the court of first instance for renewal of the pro-
ceedings.
Similar mechanisms are also provided for by Article 16-septies of De-
cree Law No. 8 of 1991 in relation to sentences issued, also for crimes other
than those covered by Law No. 304 of 1982. Specifically, the rule establishes
what the consequences should be if 1) the mitigating circumstances pro-
vided for in the Italian Criminal Code or in special laws on cooperation with
the judiciary are found to have been applied as a result of false or reticent
statements; 2) the person who has benefited from it commits, within ten
years of the judgement becoming final, a crime for which there is provision
for mandatory arrest in flagrante delicto, indicative of his permanence in the
criminal circuit.
In the event that the situations described above emerge before the
judgement has become irrevocable, the Public Prosecutor is entitled to re-
quest restitution by the deadline for lodging an appeal pursuant to Article
175 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, limited to the point in the de-
cision relating to the application of the mitigating circumstances.
If, on the other hand, the nova emerges once the sentence has become
final, it may be subject to review. This is, again, a special case of revision in
peius64. The Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor is entitled to submit the request
to the Court of Appeal in the district in which the sentence was given. For
the rest, the provisions set out in Title IV of Book IV of the Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure, which governs the extraordinary means of appeal
against the revision, are observed “insofar as they are applicable”.
During the review proceedings, the court, at the request of the public
prosecutor, may order the application of the precautionary measures pro-
vided for by law.
64 The instrument of revision in malam partem is, as a rule, extraneous to the Italian
Code of Criminal Procedure. Articles 630 et seq. constitute revision as a means of appeal
prior to the removal of an irrevocable conviction (or a criminal decree of conviction) that
should be issued against those who should have been acquitted. To put it another way, it
means that the legislator intended, as a rule, to make the judged person reviewable only
when an unjust sentence was given and for the sole purpose of exonerating him. On the con-
sistency of the revision in peius with the Italian procedural system, please see R.A. RUGGIERO
(n. 26) 283 ff.
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Similarly to what has just been seen in relation to the benefits pertain-
ing to the sanctioning treatment of the convicted person, the protection
measures applied to the informant (even if not imputed) under Chapter II of
Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 may be revoked or modified both for reasons re-
lating to the actuality of the danger, its seriousness and the suitability of the
measures themselves to protect the collaborator and in relation to the con-
duct of the collaborator.
Specifically, under Article 13-quater, they entail the withdrawal of pro-
tective measures:
1) non-compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to Arti-
cle 12, paragraph 2, sections b) and e);
2) the commission of crimes indicative of the subject’s reintegration
into the criminal circuit.
They also constitute conduct that can be assessed for the purposes of
amending or revoking the measures:
1) non-compliance with other commitments undertaken pursuant to
Article 12;
2) the commission of offences indicative of the change or cessation of
the danger resulting from the collaboration;
3) the express waiver of the measures;
4) refusal to accept the offer of appropriate employment or business
opportunities;
5) unauthorised return to the places from which he/she has been
moved;
6) any action involving detection or disclosure of the identity assumed,
the place of residence and other measures applied.
More generally, the special protective measures are, in addition, not de-
finitive measures which are, in any event, subject to continuous monitoring
by the Commission under Article 10 of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991. The Com-
mission shall verify whether the conditions are met at the express request of
the authority that proposed the application of the special protection mea-
sures or, by its own motion, within the period of time set by the Commission
when it admitted the person concerned to the special protection measures,
which may not be less than six months nor more than five years. In the ab-
sence of such an assessment, the legislator shall set the deadline for such an
assessment at one year from the date on which the measure was applied.
Another reason for revocation of the protection measures is provided
for in Article 16-quater, paragraph 7, of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991. The rule,
in fact, provides that these must be revoked if, within the period of one hun-
dred and eighty days provided for therein, the statements are not made and
are not documented in the minutes explaining the contents of the coopera-
tion. Furthermore, paragraph 8 below establishes that the protection mea-
sure may be revoked even if the declaration referred to in paragraph 4 of
said rule, in which the collaborator certifies that he has provided all the in-
formation in his possession, is untrue.
The benefits obtained by the sentenced person during the enforcement
of the sentence are also revocable. Specifically, paragraph 7 of Article 16-
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nonies of Decree Law No. 8 of 1991 provides that the modification or revo-
cation of prison benefits is ordered ex officio or upon proposal or opinion of
the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor. In cases of urgency,
the supervisory magistrate is given the power to order suspension by rea-
soned decree; however, such suspension ceases to be effective if, given that it
is a decision of the supervisory court, it does not take action within sixty
days of receipt of the documents.
The same rule specifies which conduct of the convicted person must be
taken into account when deciding on the modification, revocation or pre-
cautionary suspension of prison benefits. Specifically, conduct which, in ac-
cordance with Articles 13-quater, may lead to the modification or revocation
of the special protection measures, as well as conduct which, in accordance
with Article 17-septies, may lead to the revision of the judgements which
have granted, such mitigating circumstances as regards cooperation, must
be assessed.
3. Current relevant case law (where existing)
There are currently no reports of proceedings for religiously motivated
international terrorism offences in which reward measures have been ap-
plied. However, the first national discussion group and the roundtable held
there listed a few cases that have led to significant investigative and judicial
results. As reported in Vincenzo Di Peso’s contribution65, in addition to the
hundreds of non-criminal administrative reward measures – namely resi-
dence permits66 – applied to migrants who cooperate with the police and ju-
dicial bodies from 2005 to date, information provided by three disengaged
terrorist offenders67 has enabled the Italian authorities to identify active re-
cruitment cells and to gain insight into the growing network of unofficial
channels disseminating online terrorist propaganda.
However, we have highly accurate and meaningful data: we now have
valuable documents, including Europol’s famous annual “Terrorism Situa-
tion and Trend Report”, which can help us to understand different dynam-
ics, which are not always clear in the scientific (and public) debate on these
sensitive issues. We shall now look at some of them.
From a general point of view, in the three-year period 2016-2018, in Eu-
rope, there was a significant increase in the number of persons prosecuted
for crimes related to the various aforementioned terrorism offences;
since2015, the most numerous sentences have been those against the mem-
bers of Jihadist terrorism and the trials, in general, are more frequent in
France, Belgium and Spain. It should be noted that, excluding non-prison
penalties, the highest number of convictions in 2018 is held by Greece (16),
65 Collaborators of justice in the context of the countering international terrorism italian
cases, in this Volume.
66 L’art. 2 de la d.l. 27 juillet 2005, n° 144, actuellement en vigueur en vertu de la loi n°
155 du 31 juillet 2005.
67 Tlili Lazhar, Jelassi Rihad et Zouaoui Chokri.
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followed by Spain (8), the United Kingdom (7) and Italy (6). The sanctions
imposed in practice, as is easy to imagine, still continue to increase in the
quantum: the “average” prison sentence for crimes related to terrorism is
generally seven years, compared with five in the previous two years.
As regards religious (Jihadist) terrorism, data show, from 2014 to 2018,
a high number of arrested suspects: in the last year, following seven Jihadist
attacks carried out, thirteen people were killed and forty-six wounded (none
in our country), France (273), Holland (45) and Italy (40) stand out for the
number of arrests.
With reference to the (different) political-ideological terrorism (anar-
chist or extreme left and extreme right), in Europe, in the last year, there
have been nineteen attacks (not all of them carried out) of the left-wing; a
slight decrease compared with the previous two years. Almost all the attacks
mentioned above come from Greece, Spain and Italy, “… the three countries
continued to be the epicentre of left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity in
the EU”. On the other hand, although the policies of the extreme right are
spreading like wildfire in the European Union, black terrorism (right-wing)
is no longer a relevant phenomenon: neither the number of suspects arrested
(44) nor that of the attacks (1) denote a growing trend. Among other things,
the only terrorist attack reported in 2018 was that of Luca Trani, which took
place in Macerata.
Other data is certainly of interest: one of the most accurate (wide-rang-
ing) studies of recent decades on internal and international ideological ter-
rorism of a religious matrix, highlights that, in our continent, the ideological
attacks from 1970 to 1990 were infinitely superior, from a numerical point of
view (inter alia), to those with religious background occurred in the new mil-
lennium. Furthermore, all this, if it were not for the enormous media cover-
age of the sad events that have occurred since 2001, would, to some extent,
clash with the perception that one normally has of “new” terrorism, often
described as “… danger to common life, a threat that brings disorder and de-
nies the most elementary values of human coexistence […], absolute evil,
that negative pole of the ordinary order of the world that was once symbol-
ised by the figure of the devil”.
4. Conformity of the current rewarding legislation to Art. 16 of Directive
541/2017/EU
Article 16 of Directive 541/2017/EU has not had any top-down effect on
the Italian counter-terrorism legislation68. From a wider perspective, the in-
terplay between Article 16 of the Directive and national rewarding measures
will be analysed in Section II.
68 From a comparative perspective, about the influence of Italian counter-terrorism re-
warding legislations Europe wide, see D. CASTRONUOVO, Quale lezione dagli “anni di piombo”?
La legislazione dell’emergenza e sui pentiti in prospettiva storica e comparata, in Diritto penale
XXI secolo, 1, 143-168; C. RUGA RIVA, Il premio per la collaborazione processuale, cit., 5; F. DIA-
MANTI, Misure premiali e terrorismi. Dall’esperienza italiana all’ultima evoluzione del terrorismo
islamista, in Legislazione Penale, 5 décembre 2019.
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